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 In the modern age, nationalism has profoundly impacted warfare. While 
nationalism has helped transform pre-modern societies into nation-states in part 
arguably to more efficiently wage warfare, it has also lead to a decline in the 
effectiveness of conventional military power. Warfare in late nineteenth century 
Cuba and the Philippines demonstrates many of the new features of “nationalist 
warfare,” showing increased violence is brought about not just by conventional 
technological developments, but also by “social technology” like nationalism. 
Nationalist ideology makes it nearly impossible for conventional military forces to 
occupy or control a nationalist society and suppress resistance to foreign rule. 
Attempts to suppress nationalist resistance can only be achieved by denying the 
rebellion external support and directly targeting the civilian population. The 
difficulty of suppressing nationalist resistance ensures increasingly protracted, 
bloody and destructive wars will be the norm and that within these conflicts 

















 How has the development of nationalism changed warfare since the 
eighteenth century? Most scholars agree the frequency and intensity of warfare 
has greatly increased with the rise of the nation-state (Tilly 1995; Posen 1995; 
Wimmer 2013; Downes 2008). The literature on nationalism and war is still being 
developed, but three main areas have been heavily explored to date: first, how 
warfare transforms a people into a nation-state (Grant 2005; Hutchison 2009); 
second, how nationalism transforms a state’s conventional military capabilities 
(Tilly; Posen); and third, how nationalism has increased the overall amount of 
wars and the level of violence in wars, especially towards civilians (Wimmer; 
Downes). 
 Many scholars focus on how war leads to greater nationalist sentiment 
and helps transform societies into modern nation-states. Examining the myths, 
memories and monuments of 19th century America, Susan Mary-Grant argues 
national consciousness is framed through a process of remembering sacrifices in 
warfare (2005, 509). According to John Hutchison, “warfare acts as a 
mythomoteur (or constituting myth) in the historical consciousness of many 
populations, becoming an organizing framework for explaining events and 
evaluating their place in the world” (2009, 2). Building public memorials and 
engaging in public rituals also helped “territorialize” the nation in people’s minds 
(Grant 510). 
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 Some scholars argue the desire to wage war more efficiently induced 
many states to adopt nationalist ideology. Charles Tilly argues nationalist 
principles are adopted and mimicked by states for their ability to help centralize, 
modernize and unify infrastructure and institutions, thereby increasing the state’s 
ability to wage war (1995, 190).  Tilly observes a distinction between “state-led” 
and “state-seeking” nationalism, the former initially brought about by powerful 
European states in an effort to increase their war-making capacity, the latter 
initiated by non nation-states reacting to the new and powerful military abilities of 
nation-states (1995, 190). Barry Posen argues because nationalism increases 
“the ability of states to mobilize the creative energies and the spirit of self-
sacrifice…it is purveyed by states for the express purpose of improving their 
military capabilities” (1995, 136). Wimmer agrees, arguing nationalism “made the 
first nation-states of Great Britain, the United States, and France militarily and 
politically more powerful than dynastic kingdoms or land-based empires because 
they offered the population a more favorable exchange relationship with their 
rulers who were considered more legitimate” (2013, 5).  
 Scholars also note since the modern nationalist age began there has been 
an increase in the frequency and intensity of warfare. Starting in the nineteenth 
century, there is a sharp rise in the amount of wars caused by various state and 
non-state contenders seeking control of the state in the name of a homogenous 
people (Tilly 190-91). Indeed, Wimmer argues nationalism doesn’t simply cause 
greater amounts of warfare during messy nationalist birthing periods, it also 
results in established nation-states being contested both from within and without 
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more often than before they become nation-states (2013, 24-26). Wimmer 
observes, “Statehood has become so much associated with nationalist principles 
that the terms nations and states are often used interchangeably, as in the 
‘United Nations’ or in ‘inter-national” (2013, 2). Wimmer’s extensive data sets 
shows a sharp rise in nationalist warfare across the world after 1800: at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century only 25% of global wars were “ethnic and 
nationalist,” but by 1900 that amount had risen to 40%; by 1950 it had risen to 
65%; and by 2000 it had risen 85% (2013, 3). 
 Closely parallel to studies suggesting that nationalism increases the 
modern frequency of wars, recent scholarship argues nationalism increases the 
intensity of warfare and likelihood of violence towards civilian populations. In 
Bombing Civilians, Yuki Tanaka and Marilyn Young argue non-combatants have 
become legitimate targets in modern warfare (Tanaka & Young 2009, 236). 
Downes concurs with the general body of literature suggesting wars have 
become more common and violent, observing modern “armed conflicts devolve 
into protracted wars of attrition,” in which “the probability mounts that non-
combatants will be victimized as means to reduce cost and avoid defeat” (2008, 
243). Increased violence is even more probable when states attempt to annex 
foreign territory, as groups who perceive themselves as ethnically distinct from 
“foreign” invaders are more likely to resist, making invaders more likely to target 
civilians as a means of suppressing non-combatant military resistance (Downes 
2008, 4-5). 
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 Ironically, however, some military historians focus on how nationalism 
might actually decrease the effectiveness of conventional warfare. Russell 
Weigley explores this phenomenon in The Age of Battles, in which he rather 
fascinatingly concludes that the age of conventional military warfare essentially 
ends in 1815, right around the same time most political scientists start to study 
the relationship of nationalism and warfare. Weigley argues nationalism 
transforms warfare from being strictly a military conflict, to being a political 
contest as well – the ability of irregular forces and non-combatants to resist 
“foreign” occupation, gives nationalist populations the endurance to grind down 
superior opponents in long wars of attrition (Weigley, 1991). As Wimmer 
explains, nationalism propagates “the idea that each people should be self-ruled, 
that ethnic like should be governed by like,” making it much hard to employ 
conventional military power to conquer populations that no longer view foreign 
rule as politically acceptable or legitimate (2013, 2).  
 Famed military theorists Carl von Clausewitz lived through the French 
Revolution and wrote extensively about how it transformed France’s conventional 
military capabilities, but he also noted the American and French Revolutions 
gave birth to a new kind of “warfare by insurrection” whereby civilian resistance 
to conventional armies became a “genuine new source of power” in defense of 
the nation (Clausewitz (1832) 1993, 446-447). When nationalists are defending 
their nation, conventional military success will rarely compel nationalist 
populations to stop fighting. Instead a state of total war between nationalist 
populations occurs, in which attacking civilian populations, resources and 
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infrastructure becomes viewed as legitimate and necessary military strategy 
(Weigley 1973; Downes 2008).  
 Indeed nationalism transforms a societies’ ability to defend itself from 
invasion by greatly enhancing its ability to use guerilla warfare to resist 
conventional conquest. In his exhaustive study of the history of Guerilla Warfare, 
Invisible Armies, Max Boot argues while many ideologies have motivated guerilla 
warfare throughout history, nationalism has overwhelmingly been the primary 
motivator for guerilla fighters (Boot 2013, 564). Unsurprisingly, Andrew Mumford 
argues modern guerilla resistance is so fierce that only by denying insurgents 
material resources can it be overcome (Mumford 2012). 
  The phenomena needs to be more fully examined, to help us understand 
first, that nationalism changes a population’s ability to resist foreign occupation; 
and second, that this development leads directly to increased violence towards 
non-combatant populations and civilian infrastructure. The strong commitment 
nationalist populations demonstrate towards resisting foreign occupation 
suggests in the future aggressive military deployments in foreign regions and 
state-building projects should be avoided at all costs. As warfare in the nationalist 
age has become so destructive and violent, we need to reject the idea that it will 
be waged humanely and more carefully consider the long-term consequences of 
fighting the kind of wars needed to subjugate populations in the modern era.  
 How do we determine whether or not popular resistance to foreign 
invasion is motivated by nationalism? How do nationalists believe they can 
successfully resist and defeat stronger conventional military forces? How do 
	 6	
foreign military planners respond to encountering nationalist resistance? If 
nationalist resistance is almost impossible to suppress, under what conditions 
can it actually be defeated? Just how much material support from local or foreign 
sources do nationalists need to continue fighting? While it is beyond the scope of 
this study to comprehensively answer all these questions, it will attempt to parse 
out some initial answers by comparing two cases of nationalist resistance at the 
turn of the twentieth century in Cuba (1895-1898) and the Philippines (1899-
1902). 
 Examining each case study, I will offer two related hypotheses. First, 
nationalist military leaders in both societies eventually adopted guerilla attrition 
strategies to wear down occupying forces, however such strategies require a 
certain amount of foreign assistance to succeed. Second, foreign military leaders 
responded to widespread guerilla resistance by increasing the levels of violence 
and destruction towards civilians and infrastructure, which they viewed as 
necessary to defeat the nationalist insurgency. Indeed, effective 
counterinsurgency warfare is not about winning battlefield victories or “hearts and 
minds,” but instead about denying guerillas the means to continue operating and 
punishing civilians for choosing to resist after the collapse (or in the absence of) 
conventional military and government structures. 
 While far from a comprehensive set of cases, the general time period and 
variation between the two cases does offer some advantages. First, there is a 
high amount of geographic and cultural variance between each case, which 
helps us highlight the very similar processes of nationalist resistance despite the 
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particular local features of each society. Second, nationalist resistance was 
successful in Cuba but failed in the Philippines, allowing us to contrast the 
various factors that lead to different results. Third both wars occurred before the 
age of aerial bombing, tanks, and other forms of technology often blamed for 
increasing violence towards civilians, demonstrating that modern technology is 
not solely to blame.  
 There are two main limitations to the study proposed. First, how do we 
determine whether or not popular resistance to foreign invasion is motivated by 
nationalism? Reconstructing popular discourses in these societies and 
measuring “how nationalist” each society was is very difficult to achieve with any 
empirical certainty. Thus a primary goal of the study is to measure nationalism 
through various levels and types of civilian resistance and foreign-military 
responses to such resistance. Second, the limited number of cases allows us to 
provide rich depth, but makes it difficult to draw too many larger conclusions. Is 
the small number of cases and specific historical time period affecting the 
results? Hopefully, by at least offering a rich historical narrative, specific empirical 
features of nationalist resistance and warfare can be parsed out for future large-
N studies. 
 The study will be broken up into four parts. Chapter one will briefly 
examine the origins and historical background of nationalism, as well as the 
evolution of European conventional warfare and European humanitarian war-
fighting principles since 1648. Chapters two and three will examine the Spanish-
Cuban and Philippine-American wars respectively. Finally chapter four will use 
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some of the historical background and theory provided in chapter one to analyze 
























CHAPTER I: NATIONALISM & MILITARY THEORY 
 
Section I: Nationalism 
 
 The majority of nationalism scholars argue nationalism originated 
sometime in late eighteenth or early nineteenth century Western civilization “as a 
product of the democratic and industrial revolutions” (Gorski 2000, 1429). Within 
this general consensus, scholars vary in which aspects of modernist thought they 
emphasize. First, some emphasize the constructed or imagined nature of 
nationalism (Gellner 1995, 41; Anderson 1995, 49). Second, some emphasize 
the development of vernacular languages and print-capitalism (Gellner 47; 
Anderson 56). Third, others focus on the deeper development and reach of 
capitalism and modern state institutions (Breuilly 1995, 61).  
 However, we will also consider the ethnosymbolist challenge to the 
modernist consensus, which contends nations and ethnic groups are at least 
somewhat derived from pre-modern cultures and ethnic groups (Smith 1995; 
Kaufmann 2002). Ultimately, however, it is necessary to synthesize modernist 
and ethnosymbolist approaches to effectively understand nationalism (Kaufmann 
2008). It is important to understand nationalism as a political process, rather than 
a fixed idea – the process of nationalist thinking is what determines the arbitrary 
ethnic, racial religious or cultural boundaries of modern states, not the other way 
around (Verdery 1993).   
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Modernist origins and Nineteenth Century development 
 
 According to the modernist consensus, nationalism became a socially 
relevant and measurable force sometime in the later half of the eighteenth 
century. By that time, the growth of print-capitalism and the spread of modern 
vernacular languages substantially helped spread nationalist thought throughout 
Western and Central Europe. (Gellner 1995, 47; Anderson 1995, 56). This 
“explosion of book making in vernacular languages” allowed for widespread 
communication between people from the same language groups (Anderson 
1995, 55). The extensive use of print languages helped foster the growth of 
nationalist thought by reinforcing the concept of “ethno-linguistic” groups while 
simultaneously undermining “the imagined community of Christendom” 
(Anderson 1995, 55-57). Finally, modern literacy allowed people to engage in 
direct communication with each other and the state (Gellner 1995, 47). Ultimately 
modernists emphasize the importance of understanding nationalism in terms of 
empirically measurable phenomena usually related to the development of 
capitalism and modern state institutions. As Ernest Gellner observes, 
“homogeneity of culture is an unlikely determinant of political boundaries in the 
agrarian world, and a very probable one in the modern, industrial/scientific world” 
(1995, 44). 
 However, some modernists argue that nationalism is more properly a 
nineteenth century phenomenon, caused by deeper capitalist penetration and 
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institutional development. John Breuilly argues the “development of nationalism 
as a modern form of politics was closely bound up with the nature of political 
modernization in nineteenth-century Europe” (1995, 70). According to Breuilly, 
nationalist ideology could not develop until after the establishment of the modern 
state, because only the state “possesses an elaborate institutional structure 
which delimits, justifies and exercises the claims attached to sovereignty” (1995, 
61). Capitalist development molded these new national institutions in favor of 
individualistic free-market principles, reorienting society from a distinction 
between “ruler and ruled,” to one between “state and society” (Brueilly 1995, 64). 
Thus, these institutional forces transformed feudal political identity, allowing 
people to “relate to the total [national] society directly, without mediation, rather 
than by belonging first of all to one of its sub-groups” (Gellner 1995, 46).  
 
Ethnosymbolist challenge, synthesis, and the “process” of nationalism 
 
 Some nationalist scholars challenge the consensus view that nationalism 
is a modern phenomenon to begin with. Anthony Smith and the ethnosymbolist 
school contend modern nations are unified by “a whole range of cultural and 
symbolic components – myths and symbols, but also values, memories, rituals, 
customs, and traditions” which produce “distinctive clusters” that serve to “unite 
the members of each ethnie and structure their relations and activities” (Smith 
1995, 26-27). Thus, while “nationalism is a modern ideological movement,” it 
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must draw upon “the cultural resources of pre-existing ethnic communities and 
categories” (Smith 1995, 30).  
 Smith partially embraces cultural constructivism in his formula – 
recognizing that “the ethno-historical heritage handed down through the 
generations, is always being reinterpreted and revised” – but ultimately he 
stresses cultural continuity as foundational for nation building (1995, 29). Eric 
Kaufmann agrees with the modernist view that national identity is highly 
constructed and fluid, however he explains why admittedly somewhat arbitrary 
ethno-historical heritage is still important to nationalist discourses: 
 Broad limits often emerge on the plausible range of historical, archaeological, 
geographic, genealogical, institutional and cultural ‘facts’ which have been deposited 
over time in a particular territory. Scientists, rival groups and members of one’s own 
community all serve to check implausible claims. This does not mean that fantasy 
and invention cannot survive, especially in an illiterate, closed or premodern context. 
However, in our increasingly reflexive world, the horizons of the nationalist 
imagination are bound ever closer to the empirical record (2008, 453). 
 
 The important issue is not how much cultural continuity actually exists 
between modern and pre-modern societies, but how these symbolic resources 
are employed in different political and ideological discourses at different times. 
To best understand nationalism it is important to move past the 
modernist/ethnosymbolist divide. Historically, nationalists in all societies have 
adopted both “organic” (ethnosymbolist) and “voluntarist” (constructivist) 
narratives, depending on different ideological or material interests (Kaufmann 
2008, 459). Instead of focusing on an arbitrary threshold that determines exactly 
what nationalist credentials a country needs before becoming sufficiently 
“nationalist” or a “nation-state,” we should focus on variations in “the intensity and 
scope of nationalist mobilization” (Gorski 2000, 1459).  
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 Thus when trying to understand nationalism it is vital to focus on the 
political expression or ideological process of nationalism. According to Katherine 
Verdery, “the most comprehensive possible agenda for the study of nationalism” 
is “the study of historical processes that have produced” nation-states “differently 
in different contexts” (1993, 43). As the process of “stable” nation formation is 
never complete, “what really is worth exploring is not ‘national identity’ but the 
ideology of nationalism – and unlike ‘national identities,’ nationalism has clear 
empirical referents” (Malesevic 2011, 286). The relevant question is not when the 
nation is “founded” or “established,” but when a society starts to exhibit 
nationalist political discourse or social organization. This distinction is critical for 
understanding the nationalist phenomena. As Gorski concludes, nationalism is 
“any set of discourses or practices that invoke ‘the nation’ or equivalent 
categories…[it] is not something that happened at a particular place and time; it 
is something that happens in many places and times, and in many different 
ways” (Gorski 2000, 1461-62).  
 Nationalism evolves and is interpreted differently by different groups and 
individuals within society, thus “fragmentation is the rule…we can think of the 
coherence of national identity as waxing or waning to the degree that individuals 
converge in their view of the nation” (Kaufmann 2008, 465). Even some 
modernists like Anderson argue because the “authenticity” of nationalist identities 
can never be established, nationalist “communities are to be distinguished, not 
be their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (1995, 
49). Thus nationalism will be defined here as the ideological belief that 
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individuals should be organized into states and ruled by other individuals who 
share a common linguistic, ethnic or cultural background.  
 
SECTION II: Military Theory 
 
The evolution of European warfare and The Thirty Years War 
 
 Pre–seventeenth century European warfare was destructive and deadly to 
non-combatants, however weak states, small economies, poor infrastructure, 
small populations and limited available technologies all served to reduce violence 
inherent in warfare. Thus while most sixteenth century armies had no problems 
killing non-combatants, often for non-military reasons, the above factors capped 
the amount of overall violence and suffering visited upon most populations at the 
time. Indeed, there were no protections for most peasants and pillaging was 
common and considered part of the “spoils of war,” but so long as wars remained 
small, short and inconclusive, the destruction they caused remained 
manageable. By the dawn of the seventeenth century conditions began to 
change.  
 Since the early sixteenth century trade and contact with global societies 
brought wealth and resources to Europe, which helped economies prosper and 
populations grow. The Protestant reformation destroyed the central authority of 
the Catholic Church, opening the way for European states to become 
increasingly organized around local “national” identities. These new dynastic-
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nation-states increased in size and wealth, allowing them to employ huge 
privately recruited mercenary armies. New technologies made carrying and using 
muskets and cannon much easier, while religious conflict created new wartime 
justification for attacking peasants. Thus by 1618 armies were much larger, more 
deadly, and able to campaign farther away from their home state.  
 During The Thirty Years (1618-1648) the private-mercenary system 
completely broke down, causing tremendous humanitarian suffering across 
central Europe. Although the quasi-religious nature of the war ensured a certain 
level of added violence, the real problem was the new dynastic-nation-states 
simply could not feed, pay or control their private mercenary companies. During 
the sixteenth century armies were still small enough (that is to say supply needs 
were still manageable enough) that they could sustain themselves by buying 
supplies, foraging the countryside, or at worst pillaging for food. But by the 1620s 
central European populations were too large to feed large mercenary armies 
using this system, especially during such long conflicts. As a result, mercenaries 
took matters into their own hands, first buying, then foraging and pillaging 
anything they could get their hands on. By the 1640s most central European 
states were starving and in a state of virtual anarchy, incapable of protecting their 
own people even from their own soldiers, much less the enemies. If European 
monarchs planned to continue waging war with the same speed and vigor they 
had during the Thirty Years War, something would have to be done to artificially 
restrain and moderate the violence modern warfare was now capable of 
generating. 
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 In 1648 the Peace of Westphalia brought an end to what was at the time 
the most destructive conflict in European history. The destruction was so great 
that it led to a wholesale reexamination of both the European state system and 
method of waging war. The conflict brought the idea of international law to the 
forefront of European politics and indeed helped create the nation-state system 
that still structures world governance today. This new international state system 
and corresponding body of international law radically changed the way European 
states waged war after 1648.  
 
The Peace of Westphalia, absolutism and humanitarian warfare 
 
 The mercenary system was modified to best serve the needs of absolutist 
European states, increasingly oriented towards nascent national identities. These 
new dynastic-nation-states created centralized military command and supply 
systems and took over direct control of the mercenary system. Although several 
states continued to employ small amounts of foreign soldiers, by the eighteenth 
century most countries recruited soldiers primarily from their own territories and 
populations. As a result of all these changes European states were able to 
impose strict standards for the conduct of future warfare. Modern bureaucracy 
and economic productivity helped create a supply system that could feed armies 
and spare the cities and country from damage caused by armies merely passing 
through their territory.  
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 Far from being the natural right of victory and spoils of war, armies strictly 
prohibited murder, rape, and pillaging and frequently executed violators, even 
when invading another country. Despite a political climate characterized by 
stifling absolutism, eighteenth century states made substantial progress in 
making war far less destructive and violent towards civilians. Frederick the Great, 
the Prussian monarch and military genius who best exemplified the spirit of 
enlightened despotism in the eighteenth century, strongly felt it was the duty of all 
monarchs to protect their subjects from the evils of war. As Clausewitz further 
explains, absolute monarchs stopped plundering and looting people in the 18th 
century because it was seen as ineffective and unnecessarily barbarous, “a 
practice that hurt the enemy’s subjects rather than their government,” provided 
invitation for similar reprisals, and impeded “the advance of general civilization” 
(1993, 714). 
 However, despite the general nobility of Frederick’s sentiments, they also 
belie part of the reason he and his fellow monarch-statesmen were able to take 
control of the mercenary system and wage war using such enlightened 
humanitarian principles: they were gaining absolute control over society with 
powerful new state bureaucracies. As Clausewitz observes, people in the 
eighteenth century were largely the instrument of the state, having little 
meaningful involvement in the conduct of society or war (1993, 706). The 
absolute will of eighteenth century states commanded the political obedience of 
both its soldiers and peasants, which had a doubly positive effect on mitigating 
the violence caused by warfare. Soldiers were controlled, fed and paid by the 
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state, ensuring their loyalty and preventing them from being unleashed against 
local populations. As subjects and property of the dynastic-nation-state, 
territories and the people inhabiting them could easily be transferred from one 
state to another depending upon conventional military outcomes.  
 Wars were won and lost based on conventional military goals – defeating 
enemy armies and fleets and capturing key geographic, political and military 
areas. Monarchs used these powerful new centralized states like their own 
personal resources, gambling when and how long to fight for their own personal 
gain. Clausewitz refers to this as “Diplomatic Warfare,” which he viewed as 
merely “a somewhat stronger form of diplomacy, a more forceful method of 
negotiation, in which battles and sieges were the principal notes exchanged” 
(1993, 713).  
 Diplomatic Warfare reduced the inherent violence of war and benefited 
peasants in another subtle way: by clarifying the rules, means and methods of 
war, eighteenth century dynastic-nation-states made war far more predictable. 
Because states used the same conventional methods and means of waging war, 
it became easy to anticipate the probable outcome, and easier for the weaker 
side to avoid a negative outcome by never going to war to begin with. 
Conventional Diplomatic Warfare made it easy for states to know exactly what it 
would take for other states to defeat them – how many troops they needed to 
fight and which capitals, cities, forts and ports they needed to take to force the 
other absolutist dynastic-nation-state to capitulate.  
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 Thus eighteenth century wars were often waged for limited aims by 
monarchs unwilling to substantially risk their resources. Generals were praised 
for waging wars of maneuver that featured as few battles and as little bloodshed 
as possible (Clausewitz 1993, 308). Clausewitz derisively notes most wars 
before the French Revolution were “more a matter of observing the enemy than 
defeating him” (1993, 623). Thus we must ask, what happened to idealistic goals 
such as waging wars without effecting non-combatants and trying to win wars 
with as little bloodshed as possible? One possible answer is the transformative 
effect of nationalism on modern warfare. 
 
Revolution, nationalism and Total War 
 
 Before the American and French Revolutions, large centralized absolutist 
states waged conventional warfare against each other with great success 
because they commanded the political obedience of their subjects and could use 
domestic authoritarian conditions to command them to accept the results of a 
war. However, the twin Atlantic revolutions unleashed the forces of nationalism 
and radically transformed modern warfare. Clausewitz began serving in the 
Prussian military right as the French Revolution was reaching its zenith in 1792, 
and he saw first hand the awesome military power the forces of nationalism 
helped unleash in France. The ancien regime government and military had totally 
collapsed, while the new French government was unstable and rarely under the 
control of the same group or individual for most of the 1790s. Yet despite these 
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severe handicaps the French nation-in-arms easily defended their country 
against the combined conventional forces of the rest of Europe. As Clausewitz 
explains, other European powers  
tried to meet [The French Revolution] with the diplomatic type of war that we have 
described. They soon discovered its inadequacy. Looking at the situation in this 
conventional manner, people at first expected to have to deal only with a seriously 
weakened French army; but in 1793 a force appeared that beggared all imagination. 
Suddenly war again become the business of the people – a people of thirty million, 
all of whom considered themselves to be citizens (1993, 715).  
 
 European powers had no answer to the French Revolution until they 
adopted its lessons. The most important lesson was the more involved the 
general population becomes in the war effort, the more effective the state 
becomes at fighting wars. Employing mass conscription to increase the actual 
size of the armies was a major factor, but some of the changes were harder to 
empirically measure. Increasingly after the French Revolution, states and people 
began to conduct warfare with a much higher level of energy. Because the 
population of nation-states view themselves as citizens with nationalist rights and 
obligations, they transform themselves into a far more effective fighting force 
than obedient ancien regime soldiers and peasants could ever be (Clausewitz 
1993, 717).  
 However, while modern states employ nationalism to transform their 
conventional fighting capacities, the rise of nationalism also led to another 
development in modern warfare: the rise of guerrilla war. Here it is important to 
make a distinction between “wars that were fought outside the national soil” that 
“lacked full legitimacy,” and “wars fought in defense of national soil” (Hutchison 
2009, 10). Besides making a nation-state’s conventional armed forces more 
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effective, nationalism also makes nation-states incredibly resistant to conquest 
due to the unwillingness of modern citizens to accept political rule by a perceived 
foreign power.  
 As Clausewitz observes, destroying enemy forces is often useful, but it is 
merely means to political-ends, the point being to get the enemy country to 
accept a new political settlement dictated by the invader (Clausewitz 1993, 268).  
However nationalist societies usually continue resisting even after the collapse of 
its government and conventional armed forces. Worse still, the lack of clear 
conventional objectives means guerilla war tends towards “Total War,” where 
there are virtually no social restrictions to using violence (Clausewitz 1993, 640). 
Downes suggests modern states target civilians and infrastructure as a result of 
frustration with failed counterinsurgency strategies, but it is probably more likely 
that most effective counterinsurgency strategies target civilians to begin with 
(2008, 4) As a result, a people in arms can easily elevate war to the absolute 
level, making total destruction or genocide possible (Clausewitz 1993, 269). 
 Clausewitz observed and documented the growth of nationalist warfare 
outside France as well, arguing that “war by means of popular uprising” was a 
19th century phenomenon. Indeed, the term “guerilla,” which means “little war” in 
Spanish, originated from the Spanish War of Liberation against the French 
(1808-1814). (Clausewitz was aware of the American War of Independence and 
briefly mentions it in conjunction with the Spanish War but he did not study it 
carefully). As the nineteenth century progressed, Spain and Russia 
demonstrated against the French what the Americans had against the British in 
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the 1770s: that “the prospect of eventual success does not always decrease in 
proportion to lost battles, captured capitals, and occupied provinces…something 
diplomats used to regard as dogma” (Clausewitz 1993).  
 However, there is a crucial difference between American, Spanish and 
Russian resistance to foreign occupation and late nineteenth century guerilla 
resistance in Cuba and the Philippines: conventional forces were never fully 
defeated in America, Spain and Russia, whereas in Cuba and the Philippines 
guerillas continued to resist occupation without help from conventional forces. Let 
us now turn to the turn of the twentieth century to examine the effects of 
nationalist resistance in warfare outside of Europe, where Europeans found their 
newfound enlightenment commitment to conventional humanitarian warfare 














CHAPTER II: WARFARE IN CUBA (1895-1898) 
 
Section I: Historical background 1492–1895 
 
Spanish mercantilism, early Anglo-American ties, and the sugar economy 
 
  Columbus arrived in Cuba in 1492 and claimed the island for Spanish 
crown, which established its first permanent colony there in 1511. Over the 
course of the sixteenth century most of the native 350,000 Taino Indians were 
killed by Spanish labor, swords or germs, though many probably intermixed with 
Spanish colonists, who were disproportionately male. By the early seventeenth 
century native-born Spanish administrators, soldiers, merchants and clergymen 
known as peninsulars stood atop the island’s socioeconomic system. Second 
generation or Cuban born creoles were below the peninsulars but still possessed 
some political and economic rights and were still above Indians and slaves. As 
Philip Foner explains, “the peninsulars occupied “nearly all off the positions in the 
colonial bureaucracy” and “dominated the commercial life of the island,” while the 
creoles “were principally landowners – cattle raisers and tobacco, coffee and 
sugar planters – and the professional people” (1972, xv).  
 During the 17th and 18th centuries Spain began importing African slaves to 
Cuba to increase the commercial agricultural production of tobacco and sugar. 
Overall the Cuban economy grew substantially during the 18th century, however 
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commercial agriculture was less productive in Cuba than in French or British 
Caribbean colonies due to inferior sugar refining technology, smaller labor 
supplies, inadequate shipping, and crippling Spanish taxes. As Louis Perez 
observes, “On all counts, and all at once, Spanish colonialism was straining to 
accommodate the changes transforming the Cuban economy and revealing itself 
incapable of doing so” (1990, 1-3). 
 The pressure Spanish mercantilism placed on the Cuban economy was 
partly alleviated first by British occupation of Havana in 1762 during the Seven 
Years War, and second by the American War for Independence in 1776. 
Towards the end of the Seven Years War, Great Britain invaded Cuba and 
occupied Havana for a year between 1762-63. The British allowed Cuba to trade 
with British North America and form new business contacts with the Anglo-
American world. In a single year of occupation Britain also allowed Cuba to 
import ten times as many slaves as the Spanish usually permitted (Perez 1990, 
4).  
 When the American colonists rebelled against Britain in 1776, Cubans 
were allowed and encouraged to openly trade with the thirteen colonies again. 
However after the United States became independent, Spain reverted to many of 
its more stifling mercantilist policies, such as forcing Cubans to trade only with 
Spain and ship their goods using Spanish merchants. This process further 
alienated creoles from Spain and the peninsulars because “it increased the 
strength of the mercantile/commercial sector, largely Spanish, over the 
agricultural/ranching sector, mostly Cuban” (Perez 1990, 4-9). 
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 Changes in the 1790s further altered the Cuban economy and temporarily 
forestalled the growing conflict between Cuban creoles and Spain. The Haitian 
Revolution (1791–1803) led to a collapse in world sugar production and resulted 
in the creation of the second independent republic in the Western hemisphere. 
Haiti was the world’s leading producer of sugar before the revolution, thus global 
sugar prices tripled as a result of the rebellion. An influx of Anglo-American 
capital and technology combined with Spain’s vigorous importation of slaves 
allowed Cuba to take advantage of the Haitian crisis by establishing a sugar 
industry that would dominate world sugar production during the nineteenth 
century. However, not all Cubans benefited from the newfound success of Cuban 
sugar. Though the sugar industry developed rapidly, many of the riches flowed 
into the Spanish treasury or peninsular merchants and officials “who dominated 
the critical import-export nexus around which the Cuban economy was 
developing” (Perez 1990, 8).  
 
Latin American revolutions, Cuban demographics, and Spanish finances 
 
 Between 1810 and 1825 rebel armies in Central and South America 
destroyed most of Spain’s New World Empire, but Spain continued to rule Cuba 
by maintaining the racial hierarchy and complex socioeconomic ties with the 
United States. Some Cuban creoles wanted to join their sister colonies in their 
revolt against Spain but the United States prevented any serious attempt from 
occurring. In 1825 Mexican and Venezuelan agents planned to send military aid 
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to help eject the Spanish from the island, “but the United States, fearing an 
independent Cuba would lead to the end of slavery with repercussions in the 
Southern states, let it be known that it would block any move to liberate Cuba 
from Spain” (Forner 1972, xvi).  Changes in Cuban demographics from 1762 
onwards explain why the U.S. perplexingly supported a European colonial power 
in the Western hemisphere merely two years after President Monroe issued his 
famous doctrine. Between 1512-1762 about 60,000 Africans were imported to 
Cuba, but between 1762-1797 more than 100,000 entered the colony (Perez 
1990, 8). The influx of slaves made the idea of Cuban independence dangerous 
to both white Cubans and American elites. The existence of one independent 
black republic in Haiti comprised of former slaves already threatened to 
undermine order in other slave societies around the Caribbean basin, so white 
elites in both Cuba and the United States had a mutual interest in supporting 
each other’s slave systems. As John Tone explains, “Racial fear, heightened by 
the memory of what had happened in Haiti and kept alive by frequent slave 
mutinies…induced a certain docility among whites, who saw Spain as the 
guarantor of the slave system and of white supremacy in Cuba” (2006, 16-19).  
 Although Cubans failed to gain independence in 1825, several other 
developments over the course of the nineteenth century weakened the political 
bonds between Spain and Cuba. The beginning of the nineteenth century was 
disastrous for Spain, as Tone explains “Maritime war with Great Britain before 
1808 and Napoleon’s brutal occupation of the country afterwards destroyed the 
Spanish fleet and commerce, lives and property” (2006, 17). Furthermore, after 
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loosing control over most of their colonies, the Spanish lost their primary source 
of revenue. Constantly in debt and in search of new revenues, the Spanish 
government taxed its remaining colonies to pay its bills. Spanish taxes crippled 
Cuba and “for most of the nineteenth century Cubans paid roughly twice as much 
in taxes per capita than Peninsular Spaniards” (Tone 2006, 17). As the 
nineteenth century continued to unfold, the cost of five civil wars and colonial 
wars in Africa, the Americas and Asia only worsened Spain’s financial problems 
(Tone 2006, 18).  
 By the 1860s many Cuban creoles had gained wealth but still desired 
political rights and freedom from high Spanish tariffs. Events in Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic helped precipitate the first break between Cuba and Spain. 
Haiti invaded the Dominican Republic in 1861 and the Dominican government 
agreed to accept renewed Spanish authority in exchange for military help. 
However after the Spanish defeated the Haitians, the Dominicans decided they 
did not want to be ruled by the Spanish again after all. Dominican guerilla tactics 
and tropical disease induced Spain once again to leave the island by the summer 
of 1865, perhaps not incidentally also right after the U.S. Civil War ended, leaving 
the United States free again to defend the Monroe Doctrine. The Dominican war 
demonstrated to Cubans the potential effectiveness of guerilla fighting, but more 
importantly it led Spain to impose additional crippling taxes on Cuba in 1867. 
Disaffected Cuban creoles finally raised the banner of revolt in October 1868 




The First Cuban War for Independence or “Ten Years War” 
 
 During the first Cuban War for Independence or “Ten Years War,” Cuban 
rebels gained control over large parts of eastern Cuba, but the rebellion did not 
gain momentum until after rebel leaders declared themselves against slavery in 
1870. The massive surge in slave importation starting in 1762 radically altered 
the demographic picture of the island by the mid-nineteenth century. By 1841 
Cuba had a population of one million people, 436,000 slaves, 153,000 free 
blacks and 411,000 whites (Perez 1990, 12) Elite creole nationalists were 
everywhere on the island, but the majority of guerilla fighters were black or 
multiracial and from the Eastern part of the island or “Oriente.” The majority of 
Cuba’s population was now black and for them political independence was 
fundamentally interwoven with emancipation and gaining social rights. Thus only 
after the rebels declared themselves for independence and emancipation did the 
movement gain popular support “as thousands of Afro-Cubans flocked to the 
insurrection” (Tone 2006, 24). Rebellious white Cuban creoles realized they 
could not liberate the island without the Afro-Cuban population, who would 
indeed comprise the majority of guerilla fighters in both wars (Tone 2006, 22–25). 
 Despite several years of successful resistance, the Cuban rebels were 
ultimately defeated in 1878. Spain was trapped in various states of revolution, 
civil war and domestic disorder between 1868 and 1875, which limited the 
government’s initial response to the rebellion. After the Spanish monarchy was 
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restored in 1875, the government was strong enough to pursue a “divide and 
conquer” strategy against the rebels. By the 1870s Cuba was divided between a 
“poorer, blacker and more rebellious” East and a “richer, whiter, and more 
tranquil” West (Tone 2006, 28). At first these division helped get the rebellion 
started – the far less developed East proved difficult to access for Spanish troops 
and rebels were able to subsist off of local agriculture and artisanal production. 
Ultimately, however, the increasingly divergent lines of development taken by 
each half of the island meant that while independence or at least autonomy from 
Spanish rule had great appeal in the East, Westerners still felt loyal to Spain.  
 The Spanish took advantage of this situation by constructing a “trocha” or 
trench that divided the island in half and isolated the Easterners. The rebels 
lacked experience and discipline, so Eastern troops were largely unwilling to fight 
far from their homes and without international support they constantly suffered 
from a lack of modern weapons, ammunition and supplies. As they grew more 
desperate Cuban guerillas adopted the strategy of systematically destroying 
commercial agriculture, which led to “an equally destructive Spanish response” 
(Tone 2006, 1). However, the strategy was barely tested, mostly because the 
rebels could not access valuable commercial areas located on the Western parts 
of the island, but in part because leadership feared it was too destructive (2006, 
1). 
 Indeed the fears of Cuban rebel leadership were well founded. The limited 
campaigns of destruction the rebels carried out gave Spain cause to destroy 
suspected rebel homes, crops and even institute a basic form of re-concentrating 
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the population into controlled hamlets. By 1878 the rebels were spent and they 
agreed to the Pact of Zanjon, officially ending the first Cuban War for 
Independence. As Tone explains, “Even a second-rate standing army can defeat 
inexperienced insurgents who are not fighting in collusion with regular forces and 
who are not receiving significant outside help” (2006, 22-25). However as Foner 
explains, the “Treaty” of Zanjon “was nothing but a truce. The first War for 
Independence had opened an abyss between the Spanish metropolis and its 
Cuban colony…Revolutionary activity did not cease after 1878” (1972, xix). 
 
Emancipation, global economics, and Cuban nationalism 
 
 Matters still had to deteriorate for some time in Cuba before an island wide 
revolt could be initiated. The most important factor was the abolition of slavery, 
which Spain gradually implemented between 1878 and 1886 as part of the Treaty 
of Zanjon (Tone, 25). This was doubly injurious for Spanish rule because by 
freeing Afro-Cubans Spain provided a ready pool of guerilla fighters for the next 
conflict while simultaneously removing the primary reason white Cubans had to 
continue supporting Spain. The remaining factors were mostly caused by 
international economic conditions that Spain had little control over. The growth of 
the extremely efficient European beet sugar industry led to a decline in the value 
of Cuban sugar, which was only partially offset by importing and employing even 
more capital–intensive American sugar refining techniques. However, these 
developments benefited large plantation owners and foreign investors and 
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creditors far more than small owners, farmers or workers (Tone 2006, 26–27, 
Perez 1990, 56–57).  
 As a result of these changes, previously well-to-do or at least marginally 
profitable smaller local producers could no longer compete, making rebellion 
even more appealing to them. At the same time all these economic hardships 
meant less work and opportunity for newly freed Afro-Cubans. As Perez argues, 
“the collapse of sugar prices affected every sector of the local economy and 
announced calamity for Cuba…Across the island the Cuban grip over production 
slipped, announcing the demise of the Creole planter class” (1990, 56).  
 The situation was made even worse by Spain’s financial neglect of Cuba. 
From 1878 onwards Spain did not invest in any new development projects and 
spent almost nothing on building or maintaining infrastructure for the island. The 
final push was the massive global recession of 1893, which led both Spain and 
the United States to raise protective tariffs that crippled the Cuban economy. 
Indeed, Tone notes that some contemporary observers felt once the 1894 
McKinley Tarrif bill passed, revolution in Cuba was inevitable (2006, 26–28). 
 While many different Cubans opposed continued Spanish rule, they were 
divided between two principal camps. Whiter, wealthier, Cuban creole rebels with 
strong ties to U.S. businessmen and government provided much of the 
leadership, propaganda and finances for the rebellion, but while they desired 
formal independence from their colonial masters, they still wanted to maintain 
much of the old socioeconomic order and hierarchies that benefited them. In truth 
they feared full democracy almost as much as continued Spanish rule, and they 
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heavily embraced their European and American connections, political, social and 
financial. Many white creole children were educated in the United States, and as 
Cuba descended into a state of quasi-anarchy in the 1880s, elite creoles 
increasingly moved their wealth to America as well. As Perez explains, “Fearful 
of political turmoil and haunted by the specter of race war and social chaos at 
home, Cuban elites in increasing numbers took to investing abroad…By 1895 an 
estimated $25 million from Cuba was on deposit in U.S. banks” (1990, 66-67).  
 During the war men like Generals Maximo Gomez and Calixto Garcia, 
both white creoles and veterans of the Ten Years War, represented the interests 
of Cuban bourgeoisie (Tone 2006, 3). However, even they did not entirely 
represent the wealthiest elites and their elite American connections, who 
remained behind the scenes throughout most of the war. Despite their race and 
class, both Gomez and Garcia were strongly committed to full independence 
throughout the war, suggesting that despite their relative conservatism, even they 
were more closely politically aligned to the lower classes than many Cuban elites 
(61). Indeed, Garcia was so disgusted by the outcome of the war and American 
treatment of his troops that he resigned shortly after the American occupation 
began in 1898 (Perez 1990, 97-98).  
 However, wealthy Cubans were not the only ones forging ties of intimacy 
with Americans during this time. “Over the later half of the nineteenth century, 
more than one hundred thousand men, women, and children, almost 10 percent 
of the population, took up residence abroad…mostly in the United States” (Perez 
1990, 65). While wealthier Cubans tended to migrate towards cities on the 
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American east coast, working class Cubans tended to migrate to Florida and 
especially Tampa, which was barely even a city before the arrival of the Cuban 
cigar industry (66).  Cuban migrants to Florida were more likely to be politically 
radical, either anarchist or socialist, and tended to sympathize more with the 
poorer, blacker afro-Cubans who would provide most of the soldiers and local 
agriculture and infrastructure to support the rebellion. These groups embraced a 
different kind of national rebellion, one that began by eliminating formal Spanish 
rule and then proceeded to overturn the old socioeconomic order and hierarchy 
that denied them basic rights and opportunities. As Perez explains, “disaffection 
with colonialism had become as much a dispute between Cubans themselves as 
between Cubans and Spaniards. Inequity in Cuba by the 1890s had a peculiarly 
home-grown quality” (80). General Antonio Maceo, also a veteran of the Ten 
Years War, represented the interests of poorer and more radical nationalists 
groups. During the Ten Years War he was probably one of the only Afro-Cubans 
to become an officer, and his refusal to sign the Peace of Zanjon and its “gradual 
promise” to end slavery in 1878 earned him great respect among the Afro-Cuban 
population (Foner 1972, xix).  
 Both groups were nationalist in that they wanted to see Cuba free from 
formal Spanish rule, but they remained divided into the early 1890s over whether 
the future rebellion was meant to create a state along liberal–capitalist–
republican lines or “liberational”–socialist–democratic ones. Although Jose Marti 
was born into a family that sympathized more with the former kind of thinking, 
over time he began to advocate strongly for the welfare and interests of all 
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Cubans. As Perez observes, “For decades, Cuba Libre had remained an 
essentially undefined and wholly ambiguous formulation. Most agreed that free 
Cuba meant free separation from Spain. In the 1880s, largely through the efforts 
of Jose Marti, Cube Libre came to mean something more” (1990, 77).  
 Initially Marti attempted to organize a new political party advocating 
independence for Cuba in conjunction with elite Cuban émigrés in New York, 
however he found them fundamentally opposed to his new vision. As Perez 
adds, “Marti was an indefatigable political activist” and he understood “the need 
to establish a revolutionary party to give Cuba Libre ideological substance and 
institutional structure” (1990, 77). Thus in 1892 Marti moved to Tampa and 
formed the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC). Marti pledged to commit the PRC 
“to armed struggle by uniting Cubans in exile with patriots on the island for the 
common purpose of waging a war for independence and providing moral and 
material support for the revolution in Cuba” (1990, 77). As Tone explains, before 
the 1890s  
there had always been a great deal of tension between Cuban-Working class 
organizations and the separatists, the workers sometimes fearing the Cuban 
‘bourgeois’ revolutionaries more than the Spanish. In contact with the exiled workers 
in Florida, however, Marti developed a new and appealing social agenda. 
Independence now came to mean agrarian reform, better wages and conditions for 
workers and other concessions to the laboring people. This was the formula that 
finally mobilized Cuban workers – both émigrés and those still on the island – behind 
Marti and independence (Tone, 36).   
 
 However despite Marti’s and the PRC’s commitment to social as well as 
political revolution, “above all, Marti was passionate and uncompromising in 
defining the goal of Cuban arms: independence, full and complete sovereignty, 
from both Spain and the United States” (78). Given their willingness to acquiesce 
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to the Platt Amendment in 1901, (which restricted Cuba’s full sovereignty and 
independence), it is likely wealthy Cuban elites were only using the dreams of 
poor creoles and Afro-Cubans to help supply the manpower necessary to defeat 
Spanish armies, however for the time being Jose Marti’s vision and propaganda 
united the Cuba émigré community with Cubans aspiring for political and social 
changes at home. Whatever their vision of the future, Marti managed to unite 
Cuban nationalists of all varieties in common opposition to continued formal 
Spanish rule and helped get the rebellion off the ground.  
  
SECTION II: Warfare in Cuba February 1895–February 1896 
 
Spanish inaction, Marti’s death and Total War 
 It is difficult to fix an exact point when the Second Cuban War for 
Independence began, but most historians mark the citizens uprising at Baire on 
February 24 1895 as the official starting point. The recession of 1893 further 
blurred the line between banditry and rebellion in Cuba, so Spain did not take the 
revolt seriously for the first two months, hoping recently enacted reforms would 
satisfy the increasingly rebellious population. The rebels took advantage of 
Spain’s inaction by expanding their control over Eastern Cuba with relative ease, 
ensuring Spain would have to mount a substantial and costly military effort in 
order to restore control over the island. As Tone explains, the Spanish “tried to 
act as if nothing were amiss, for to do otherwise would have been to admit the 
painful truth that the time for reforms had passed” (2006, 46). As the reforms 
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failed and the rebellion spread, political turmoil in Spain nearly collapsed the 
Spanish government and brought a new more reactionary administration to 
power. In April the reforms were abandoned and a new military commander, 
Martinez Campos, was sent to the island alongside thousands of reinforcements 
to deal with the rebels more aggressively (Tone 2006, 43-49). 
 By the time Campos arrived on the island, Jose Marti, Maximo Gomez, 
Antonio Maceo and many other rebel leaders were already consolidating their 
forces. In late April 1895 the rebels initiated a series of small offensives against 
Spanish controlled towns in Eastern Cuba. Unfortunately Marti died within weeks 
of landing, leaving the war effort to be directed largely by Gomez and Maceo, 
both military men who earned their reputations as excellent guerilla commanders 
in the Ten Years War. After Marti’s death, Gomez and Maceo convinced rebel 
leadership to adopt a strategy of Total War waged using guerilla tactics. Indeed 
Marti’s manner of death itself – killed while charging Spanish regulars atop a 
white horse – served as somewhat of a metaphor for the failure of conventional 
tactics to bring about the desired results in Cuba or other colonial situations. 
Even though the rebels had more support and resources in 1895 than ever 
before, it was still not enough to defeat Spanish forces in open combat. Tone 
explains: “Cuban insurgent leaders knew that there was no profit in openly facing 
Spanish armies, so they pursued a guerrilla campaign of hit-and-run operations 
aimed at property, civilians loyal to the colonial regime, and means of 
communication and transportation” (2006, 9). 
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 According to the new strategy, “Cuban forces would avoid the Spanish 
except under very controlled circumstances and attack instead the economic 
resources of the island: crops, structures, and civilians” (Tone 2006, 57) Thus the 
rebel strategy of initiating “Total War” entailed much more than merely fighting a 
guerilla war of attrition designed to slowly bleed Spain of soldiers and resources. 
Total War meant annihilating the Cuban economy in order to deny the Spanish 
crown and foreign investors revenues and profits. In short, the rebels planned to 
make government and business so unprofitable in Cuba that Spain would see no 
point in spending more lives and treasure to maintain control and foreign 
investors would loose faith in the Spanish government. The hope was that 
members of the international community would either exert pressure on Spain to 
grant Cuba independence or recognize the rebel government and deal with it 
directly (60). 
 During the Ten Years War, Gomez tried to implement a policy of 
annihilating the Cuban economy, but he was constrained by other rebel leaders 
who felt the policy was simply too barbarous and destructive (Tone 2006, 64). 
Indeed as Tone argues, Cuban leadership “knew that the strategy of shutting 
down the economy would bring dislocation, desperation, emigration and death” 
(2006, 60). However to Gomez victory was the only thing that mattered: The 
Cubans were fighting a war of “extermination” against the Spanish and would 
expel the Spanish from the island by any means they could (Tone 2006, 61). 
Furthermore, Gomez’ scorched-earth strategy dovetailed nicely with another 
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Total War policy he implemented: refusing to acknowledge the existence of non-
belligerents in the war (65).  
 Cubans had to choose either Spain or the rebellion, with no room left for 
anything in between. The Cubans employed a policy of “deconcentration” 
whereby civilians living in or near Spanish zones of control were required to 
leave their homes and move to Cuban controlled zones in the countryside (Tone 
2006, 66). Movement between Spanish and Cuban zones was not to be tolerated 
and any Cubans found supporting the Spanish in virtually any way could be 
summarily executed.  
 Of course Cuban Spanish loyalists engaged in similar practices towards 
captured rebels. Total War resulted in assassination and terrorism on both sides 
and it also unofficially began reconcentration by forcing many peasants unwilling 
to join the rebellion to seek protection in Spanish cites and towns (Tone, 217). 
While it seems doubtful Jose Marti would have embraced the idea of burning 
Cuba to the ground to liberate it, as far as we know, no one else in the rebel 
camp seriously challenged Gomez on this point. Thus it seems reasonable to 
conclude wealthier rebels were willing to give Total War a try if it meant winning 
the war and gaining independence from Spain. 
 
Eastern liberation, rebel advantages and Spanish dispersion 
 
 Rebel leadership wanted to invade the West as soon as possible, but they 
needed several months to gain the necessary manpower, weapons, and supplies 
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to do so. Maceo felt Cubans lost the Ten Years War because the Spanish 
isolated them in Oriente, so invading the West was vital: the rebels could not 
allow themselves to be penned up in Oriente as they had been during the first 
rebellion (Tone 2006, 70). By June the Cubans had control over large portions of 
the Eastern part of the island except for the major towns and forts. In Tone’s 
view, most Easterners were probably at least sympathetic or directly supporting 
the rebellion at this point (72). The hot climate generated rains and tropical 
disease that effectively immobilized Spanish forces in June, July and August. 
Thus during the summer of 1895 Maceo regularly attacked Spanish outposts, 
couriers and convoys with relative ease and success (70–75). 
 Attacking weaker Spanish forces generated good press and helped recruit 
more soldiers for the Cuban Liberation Army, but it was not the rebel’s main 
objective. Spain wanted Cuba for profit, so the rebels decided the surest path to 
liberation was to make Cuba unprofitable. In July 1895 the rebels issued a 
proclamation banning farmers from transporting and selling food and other 
commodities in Spanish controlled territory. Cubans who violated these rules 
were sometimes tried, but more often summarily punished by rebel troops. Rebel 
leadership justified these harsh measures because destroying the Cuban sugar 
economy “would make empire unprofitable to the Spanish government, to 
Spanish merchants, manufactures, and laborers, and to Cuban planters allied 
with Spain” (Tone 2006, 58).  
 This policy also had the effect of creating thousands of unemployed 
refugees, but the rebels felt such people would either join them or flee to Spanish 
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safe zones, thereby straining Spain’s ability to feed and protect them. This was 
also an exercise in social engineering and class warfare, as the rebels especially 
planned to target “big planters, manufacturers, mining operations, urban 
properties, and lines of communication and commerce, while protecting small 
farms that lay in rural regions beyond the reach of the Spanish” (Tone 2006, 58). 
The Provisional Cuban government even declared that large estates would be 
distributed between small property owners after the war (Tone 2006, 57–59). 
 By July the Spanish were tired of looking for the Cuban rebels and started 
sending out intentionally smaller detachments hoping to lure a larger Cuban force 
into battle. On July 14th Maceo and a Cuban force of 2,000 men laid a trap for 
one such detachment near Peralejo in the province of Santiago de Cuba. 
Spanish informants spoiled the trap but the Cubans managed to win the day 
largely due to Spanish overconfidence and Cuban tactics. As Tone explains, “the 
Cubans employed superior tactics at Peralejo, using their rifles to fight in a 
modern, open formation, while the Spanish fought as if on a Napoleonic 
battlefield” (2006, 79). Spanish soldiers were trained to fight conventional 
European wars, while Cuban guerillas were prepared by their own previous 
experience in the Ten Years War. Indeed as the American Civil War recently 
demonstrated, the development of accurate high-powered rifles with long ranges 
was making conventional frontal engagements increasingly useless and often 
suicidal.  
 Of course non-attachment to outdated tactics was not the only advantage 
Cuban guerilla troops had. Cuban rebels benefited massively from detailed 
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knowledge of local geography possessed by local supporters and informants who 
provided them with military intelligence about Spanish movements and plans 
(Tone 2006, 76-77). The rebels also took advantage of early Spanish inaction by 
rounding up most of the local horses, and because Spain was unable to transport 
enough replacements to the island, the rebels always had more cavalry and the 
advantage of mobility. The core of the CLA was mounted, and during the first 
year and half they could usually evade heavily armed Spanish regulars (Tone 
2006, 76-79). Tone argues geography also benefited guerilla war: “In effect, all of 
Cuba’s neighbors share a long border with the island, and in the nineteenth 
century all of them could serve as a jumping-off points for expeditionaires – 
called filbusteros – bent on arming Orientales to overthrow Spanish rule” (2006, 
22). 
 Meanwhile another rebel force under Gomez moved westward into Puerto 
Principe, destroying property, requisitioning supplies, and evading larger Spanish 
forces in his famous “circular campaign” around the province. Gomez also had 
enough men to carry out some surprise attacks against Spanish garrisons and 
towns, and their success along with the triumph over the Spanish at Peralejo 
helped recruit thousands of men during the summer of 1895 (Tone 2006, 81). 
Spanish counteroffensives in October and November yielded limited but 
ultimately insignificant success against small groups of rebels. Although the 
Spanish now had almost 100,000 regular troops on the island, most of them were 
dispersed in towns, garrisons and plantations. This left the Spanish with about 
25,000 mostly dismounted and often diseased infantry to chase around several 
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thousand mounted Cuban guerillas. The results were predictable: Spanish 
soldiers died in scores from tropical disease while Cuban guerillas destroyed 
property and recruited men with relative ease (2006, 113).  
 The problem with troop dispersion was that garrisons were often too small 
to defend the sugar cane fields, which were very easy to burn. Furthermore 
garrisons could only control the town or fort they were tasked to defend, they 
could not protect the countryside and were utterly depended on constant 
resupply columns that were easy targets for Cuban guerillas. Lastly when the 
main body of the Liberation army formed up, only the largest garrisons in major 
cities and forts were truly safe from being overrun. While the loyalty of Cuban 
elites, businessmen and Westerners superficially appeared to be an asset, the 
need to defend such people against guerilla opponents was a liability (Tone 
2006, 114). 
 
Mal Tiempo, invading the West, and the Cuban civil war 
 
 In late November Gomez and Maceo gathered their strength to move 
west. The Trocha in Puerto Principe had been left to rot since 1878 and the 
rebels had no difficulty passing through it, while the Spanish decision to disperse 
forces throughout the countryside left them without enough manpower to stop the 
rebel advance. In December 1895 the rebel columns entered the province of 
Santa Clara and were preparing for the final push into the island’s Western 
“sugar bowl.” On December 15 at Mal Tiempo Cuban forces won a second 
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battlefield victory against the Spanish. Once again the Spanish had sent several 
smaller detachments out trying to entice the Cubans to give battle and once 
again the Cubans found and defeated one of their detachments, capturing a 
substantial amount of supplies in the process. According to Tone, the victory at 
Mal Tiempo was a turning point of the war because “it opened the way for the 
invasion of Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio, where the Liberation Army 
began at last to make good on Gomez’s promise to shut down Cuba’s export 
economy by burning down everything associated with the commercial production 
of sugar and tobacco” (2006, 125). 
 After the victory at Mal Tiempo the rebels invaded Matanzas province and 
found themselves firmly in “Spanish Cuba.” In many cases the residents were 
quite literally Spanish – almost 420,000 Spanish migrated to Cuba between 1868 
and 1894, and in parts of Western Cuba they possibly even outnumbered native-
born Cubans (Tone 2006, 93). The war in the east was primarily a war of 
liberation, but the war in the West took on many of the features of a civil war. 
This was in part because of the presence of so many native born Spaniards in 
the region, but also because the West was the stronghold of white supremacy 
(Tone 2006, 94). When the Liberation Army moved through Western provinces, 
they were most often joined by Afro-Cubans. When Spanish forces reasserted 
control over areas, they placed special emphasis on punishing blacks in order to 
reassert the racial order (Tone 2006, 140). As Tone explains, “the arrival of 
Maceo’s easterners in the West was never simply moment of ‘liberation’ but a 
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complex encounter characterized by collaboration, resistance, and attempts to 
avoid either” (2006, 142). 
  In western Matanzas Spanish forces at Coliseo finally repulsed the 
Liberation Army, halting its advance towards Havana. Unfortunately for the 
Spanish the victory was entirely negated by superior Cuban strategy. Seeing the 
Cubans in full retreat towards the East, the Spanish transported their army by 
sea to block their path. However the Cubans anticipated this and after four days 
of retreat doubled back to find the path west now conveniently cleared for them 
(Tone 2006, 137). Traditionally after being defeated in battle conventional armies 
would retreat along their line of supply line towards their base of operations, 
however Cuban rebels embraced a strategy that placed no value on such things. 
 By the end of January 1896 the Cuban Liberation Army made good on its 
promise to destroy the West. Indeed, the rebel’s achievements shocked the 
Spanish: “Between late November and late January, the Cubans had marched 
the length of the island, avoiding larger Spanish armies, defeating or at least 
fighting to a draw several smaller ones, and making their presence felt in every 
corner of the island. Smoke from burning cane fields and the ruins of dozens of 
sugar mills, bridges, and towns testified to the Liberation Army’s success” (Tone 
2006, 150). As a result the Spanish government relieved Martinez Campos and 
sent Valeriano Weyler to take command of Spanish forces. To Weyler the 
solution to the problem the Spanish faced was clear: “the key to victory would be 




SECTION III: WARFARE IN CUBA February 1896–August 1898 
 
Trochas, counterinsurgency, and concentration camps 
 
 Like many of the senior Cuban commanders, and unlike most Spanish 
officers, Weyler had previous experience fighting guerilla wars. As a young 
officer during the Ten Years War he set up the antecedent for “free-fire” zones, 
where, just as in Vietnam, civilians who did not evacuate were considered enemy 
combatants and legitimate targets (Tone 2006, 155). In 1891 as Governor of the 
Philippines, Weyler attempted to crush guerilla fighters in Mindanao by 
concentrating the local civilian population in Spanish controlled zones. 
Fascinatingly, Weyler even attempted to reconcentrate Filipinos in areas mixed in 
with Peninsular Spanish and Chinese immigrants. While many criticized this 
scheme as inhuman at the time, it was an attempt to diffuse revolutionary 
resistance by removing revolutionary minded Filipinos from their native regions 
and mixing them with different ethnic and cultural groups (Tone 2006, 157). 
 Weyler arrived in February 1896 and outlined his plan. Ineffective for 
protecting property, small garrisons and detachments would be eliminated and 
formed into several field armies. Larger field armies would systematically work 
their way through western Cuba, clearing out rebel forces and driving them back 
East across the Trocha. The Trocha would be substantially reconstructed and 
reinforced to isolate western rebels from the heart of the rebellion, a strategy that 
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worked somewhat successfully in the Ten Years War. Lastly the Spanish would 
implement full-scale reconcentration of the civilian population into Spanish zones 
of control (Tone 2006, 160). 
  Weyler also decided normal rules of war no longer applied to Cuban 
rebels. Prisoners were to be shot and known family members would be arrested, 
their assets seized or destroyed. With a new plan and new rules of engagement 
in place, the Spanish finally began to act with speed and vigor. In February and 
March of 1896 the Spanish campaigned hard, forcing the Cubans to divide their 
forces. Maceo’s column moved to the westernmost province of Pinar del Rio, 
while Gomez and the main body retreated east back across the Trocha to the 
safe confines of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba. Meanwhile strong pro-
Spanish sentiment in the western provinces of Havana and Matanzas reversed 
many of the gains made by the rebels since November (Tone 2006, 164–166).  
 In order to better protect “Spanish Cuba” and further isolate rebel forces, 
the Spanish started to build a second Trocha in the spring of 1896 to cordon off 
Pinar del Rio from Havana and Matanzas. Maceo’s column was trapped in Pinar 
del Rio and lacked strength to fight the larger Spanish columns now routinely 
pursuing rebel forces, leaving them little else to do but continue the Cuban 
Liberation Army’s campaign of destruction. Smaller and more dispersed groups 
of rebels did the same in Havana, Matanzas and Santa Clara. The arrival of hot 
summer rains and a lack of good east-west transportation helped protect rebels 
in eastern provinces, but even Puerto Principe and Santa Clara became more 
dangerous for rebel forces to operate in (Tone 2006, 168-172). 
	 47	
 The fact that the Spanish were able to accomplish so much during the 
summer season was not a good sign for the guerillas. By invading and destroying 
the west, the Cuban Liberation Army had already achieved more than most at the 
time thought possible, but hard campaigning and Spanish counter-guerilla tactics 
had badly depleted rebel manpower and resources. However, by plunging Cuba 
into a state of Total war, Cuban rebels increasingly attracted international 
attention for their cause, especially in the United States. From the beginning the 
rebels hoped that by destroying the sugar industry they could convince American 
businessmen heavily invested in the Cuban economy that if Spain could no 
longer protect their property they would have to support an independent Cuba. 
Rebel leadership understood they were now simply in a war of attrition – one that 
would be very difficult to win without help from abroad (Tone 2006, 176-177). 
 
Press censorship, economic warfare, and a timely assassination 
 
 Weyler attempted to censor the press in order to prevent Cuban rebels 
from gaining international attention, however the policy backfired badly. Ironically 
because the Spanish heavily censored official press reports, international 
journalists preferred to work with Cuban rebels who freely gave them accounts of 
their successes, both real and imagined. As a result, accounts of Spanish 
mistreatment and terrorism towards Cuban civilians were widely disseminated in 
the global press, while similar CLA behavior was rarely discussed. Indeed as 
Tone argues, while the Spanish ignored the press, Cuban rebels “had grasped 
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the crucial role that the press and world opinion would play in the outcome of the 
war”  (2006, 219-220). 
 The Cuban Liberation Army’s assault on the Cuban economy enticed the 
Spanish to engage in economic warfare as well. In April 1896 Spain prohibited 
the export of raw tobacco to the U.S. in an attempt to deprive Cuban cigar rollers 
in Florida of income they could use to aid the rebellion. In September the 
Spanish shut down the Cuban sugar industry entirely. This drastic measure was 
designed to deprive the rebels of property to destroy, conveniently also removing 
the need for Spanish garrisons to protect the sugar industry. However both 
measures proved foolish because shutting down the tobacco and sugar 
industries was exactly what the rebels wanted. Unemployed Cuban workers were 
easily recruited by the CLA and shutting down the Cuban economy angered 
foreign owners and investors. Cuban rebel leadership smartly reasoned that if 
the loss of Cuban lives would not motivate the international community to help, 
the loss of Cuban commerce might (Tone 2006, 162-163). 
 The winter campaign of 1896–97 went poorly for the rebels. Starting with 
Pinar del Rio in October, the Spanish began systematically clearing provinces 
from west to east. The newly constructed western trocha effectively blocked the 
remaining rebel forces in Pinar del Rio under Maceo from moving back east into 
Havana province. Maceo’s columns were harassed, worn down and dispersed 
and Maceo was killed trying to cross the trocha in early December. Over the next 
four months the Spanish cleared out Havana, Matanzas and Santa Clara 
provinces, scattering remaining rebel forces, dismantling their government and 
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economy, and reconcentrating the rural population. The Cuban Liberation Army 
never recovered in the West, but they were also never fully defeated. Their ability 
to maintain low-intensity guerilla operations throughout the conflict was important 
to the rebel war effort (Tone 2006, 181-189).  
 Indeed, the Spanish discovered by 1896 that low-intensity guerilla activity 
was virtually impossible to combat. It was impossible to tell the difference 
between fighters and civilians or to ignore the valuable military services being 
performed by non-combatants. Likewise, among the masses in the countryside, it 
was impossible to tell the difference between loyal Cubans and rebels. Even if 
they were loyal at heart, the Spanish correctly realized CLA terrorism was 
inducing many Cubans to help the rebels anyways. Rebels were always short of 
weapons and supplies and they often did not want to fight far from their homes. 
These problems were ultimately part of the nature of insurgency, but they were 
probably helping the rebels more than hurting them. Local populations could 
provide shelter and food, and while the Cubans hid the Spanish died from 
disease. As Tone argues, “Dispersing and doing nothing cost the Cubans less 
than active campaigning – and damaged the Spanish almost as much” (2006, 
87). 
 Thus starting in October 1896 Spain began rounding up Cuban civilians 
into entrenched camps outside large Cuban cities and towns. Cultivation zones 
were set up outside the camps to feed the refugees. The Spanish army now 
considered anyone or anything outside the safe zones a legitimate military target. 
While these harsh rules applied to all Cubans in theory, wealthy estate owners 
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were usually exempted and poor rural owners were especially targeted (Tone 
2006, 193-194).  
  As the Spanish prepared in the spring of 1897 to invade the rebel 
stronghold in the eastern provinces, it seemed to most observers that the rebels 
were in trouble. Yet while “Reconcentration worked to undermine the Cuban 
insurgency,” it also “backfired by creating an outcry in the United States” (Tone 
2006, 224). As Tone continues to explain, this was largely because “The effect of 
reconcentration was generally to turn the poor into refugees, regardless of their 
politics” (2006, 195). It created an outcry in Spain as well, especially in the more 
liberal autonomous seeking regions. In August 1897 an anarchist assassinated 
Spain’s leading conservative minister, Antonio Canovas del Castillo, paving the 
way for the Liberal party to take control of the government in October. Unwilling 
to pour more money or troops into what the international community now viewed 
as a humanitarian disaster, the Liberal government made sweeping changes to 
Spanish policy. In less than two months the new government replaced Weyler, 
ended reconcentration, halted major offensive operations and most importantly 
drafted a new constitution granting Cuba autonomy and all Cubans the right to 
vote (Tone 2006, 233-235). 
 
Humanitarian disaster, Spanish reforms, and American entry 
 
 By late 1897 reconcentration had already caused tremendous suffering 
and Spain officially ended the policy in November. However the process was 
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difficult to reverse because the rebels were also somewhat responsible for the 
nightmare of reconcentration. When the war started the rebel government quickly 
embraced an attitude of total war in which neutrality was not to be tolerated. The 
rebel campaign of destruction made little distinction between loyalists and 
neutrals, and from 1896 on it forced many destitute Cubans to seek Spanish 
protection in larger towns and cities, effectively starting the process of 
reconcentration civilians.  
 Thus unsurprisingly even after the Spanish ended the policy, the Cuban 
rebels still refused to recognize neutrality, which made it difficult or impossible for 
many refugees to return home. Indeed, the refugee crisis lasted long after Spain 
exited the island (Tone 2006, 217-218). As Tone explains, the rebels did 
everything they could to maintain reconcentration well after Spain abandoned the 
policy: 
‘Because the enemy is trying to allow the reconcentrados to leave the towns and 
return to the countryside,’ read one [rebel] proclamation, the Liberation Army would 
have to be more strict in enforcing the ‘system of warfare’ put in place by Gomez. 
Townsfolk would not be allowed to leave, unless they came all the way over the 
revolutionary camp. Simply returning to their homes was not to be permitted. On the 
contrary, ‘heads of families and men over sixteen years old’ would be required to 
plant crops in zones protected by the republic-in-arms, and if they refused, they 
would be ‘expelled’ from Cuba Libre and forced back into the cities. If the Spanish 
would not enforce reconcentration, the insurgents would (2006, 218). 
 
  Tone estimates that about 170,000 Cubans or one-tenth of the population died 
in concentration camps during and after the war (2006, 8). 
 Ironically at this point the Cuban rebellion faced a new problem: Spain’s 
grant of autonomy might be enough to satisfy international outrage, as well as 
some Cubans still resisting the Spanish. Some Cubans from the Liberation Army 
and Cuba Libre surrendered after being granted autonomy, partly out of war 
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weariness but also perhaps because it promised to bring real political rights to 
the whole Cuban population. However the leadership of the CLA was still heavily 
drawn from the more conservative reformist class of Cuban revolutionaries and 
they influenced Gomez, Garcia and most remaining senior CLA officers. They 
also controlled access to key U.S. political and business interests and they did 
not want to see the autonomist regime implemented (Tone 2006, 235-236).  
 Another major consequence of Spanish reform efforts was convincing 
loyalist Cubans Spain was no longer able or willing to maintain the social and 
racial hierarchy of the island. Perez notes, “Cuba was lost to Spain. Cuban 
successes had all but nullified Spanish claims to sovereignty” (1990, 90). Perez 
continues, “Loyalists found themselves caught between the ebbing of 
metropolitan authority and the advancing tide of colonial rebellion. Political 
separation from Spain became necessary to forestall independence under 
Cubans” (1990, 88).  Ex-loyalists wanted American entry because it would all but 
guarantee Spain’s exit from the island and give them a larger role in shaping a 
new constitution and government. Nevertheless, Tone argues most CLA fighters 
ultimately remained committed to full independence, irrespective of the views of 
loyalists, rebel elites or the rebel population. Thus as the Spanish withdrew into 
defensive positions, the rebels reconsolidated their hold over the eastern 
provinces and reiterated the call for full independence (Tone 2006, 237-238).  
 In February 1898 the U.S. battleship Maine was destroyed in Havana 
harbor and the Spanish were promptly blamed. As Tone argues, American 
imperialists “wanted a war for economic, political and strategic reasons,” but they 
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used “the twin tragedies of reconcentration and the Maine” to justify a declaration 
of war against Spain in April 1898 (Tone, 249). Later that month U.S. Congress 
passed the Teller Amendment, disclaiming any American intentions to exercise 
sovereignty over Cuba. As Perez notes this “calmed Cuban misgivings” and led 
most rebels to believe U.S. intervention “made common cause with separatist 
goals” (1990, 96). Garcia observed the U.S. never entered a formal accord with 
the rebel government-in-arms, but thought U.S. recognition of “our right to be free 
and independent” was good enough (Perez 1990, 96).  
 The United States entered the war in April 1898 and quickly defeated what 
remained of Spain’s military power. Indeed, after being at war for less than four 
months, “Crushing defeats on land and sea convinced the Spanish that 
continued war with the United States was futile” (Tone, 282). Unfortunately 
Garcia probably should have paid more attention to the absence of a formal 
accord; as Perez notes “The intervention transformed a Cuban war of liberation 
into a U.S. war of conquest” (1990, 97). 
  
“Liberation,” neocolonial dependency, and victory? 
  
 During most of the nineteenth century “the United States had pursued the 
economic colonization of Cuba without direct rule,” (Tone 2006, 246) and rebel 
leadership understood American capitalists were tired of dealing with Spanish 
protectionism and the loss of property and profit caused by the war. American 
businessmen wanted to secure their assets and investments in the Cuban sugar 
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economy and so long as the war continued, the CLA would continue to destroy 
American property Spain could not protect. However U.S. interests were 
concerned with more than protecting their investments – they also wanted to 
protect the “North American claim of sovereignty” and “expectation of colonial 
succession” (1990, 94). As Perez explains, 
The Cuban war for national liberation became the ‘Spanish-American War,’ 
nomenclature that in more than symbolic terms ignored Cuban participation…The 
construct legitimized the U.S. claim over the island as a spoil of victory. The North 
Americans had not arrived as allies of Cubans or as agents of Cuban independence. 
They had gone to war, as they always said they would, to prevent the transfer of 
sovereignty of Cuba to a third party (1990, 97).  
 With Spanish administration safely departed and American business 
interests secured, elite whites, including former loyalists, were empowered to 
govern the island. Meanwhile the vast majority of Afro-Cuban rebels would not 
even be able to vote for office under the new constitution (Tone 2006, 282-285). 
In 1901 U.S. Congress passed the Platt Amendment effectively forcing the 
Cuban government to accept American controls over several aspects of Cuban 
governance before U.S. troops would be withdrawn. Indeed, the United States 
influenced, restricted and controlled the Cuban government so extensively after 
1898 that the island was effectively a U.S. protectorate until 1934 (Loveman 
2011, 182).   
 Nevertheless it is important to recognize Cuban rebels did win to the 
extent that they were able to force the Spanish to give up formal control of their 
country. Ultimately the only thing most rebels had in common was opposition to 
formal Spanish rule. Different Cuban rebels fought for different reasons, but for 
the most part those that chose to fight remained committed to earning formal 
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Cuban independence even at the risk of being politically and socially subverted 
by fellow countrymen of a different class.  
 Although it is ironic that in defeating the Spanish the rebels traded formal 
Spanish controls for informal American ones, the distinction is significant 
because it demonstrates that guerilla resistance in the nationalist age makes it 
incredibly difficult for foreign imperialist powers to use military force and other 
formal government controls to indefinitely occupy and influence different regions 
of the world. Rebels in the CLA and Cuban civilians that supported them did not 
know what independence from Spanish rule would bring them, but the incredible 
resistance they offered against Spanish rule demonstrated just how motivating 
the desire to not be ruled by people from someone else’s “imagined community” 














CHAPTER III: WARFARE IN THE PHILIPPINES (1899-1902) 
 
Section I: Historical background 1565–1899 
 
Spanish conquest, economic transformations, and the Ilustrados 
 
 Spain began colonizing the Philippine Islands in 1565 and established 
basic control over most islands except Mindanao by the end of the sixteenth 
century. During the 17th and 18th centuries Spain used the Philippines primarily 
as a trading station between her New World Empire and China, shipping 
precious metals to China in exchange for valuable commercial goods. Spain 
primarily wanted to control the port of Manila and the valuable goods that flowed 
through it, so Spanish friars, soldiers and local Filipino elites known as maguinoo 
were left to administer the rest of the islands with little oversight from Madrid. As 
Filipino historian Reynaldo Ileto explains, “The main task of Spanish missionaries 
and soldiers in the seventeenth century was to concentrate or resettle people 
within hearing distance of the church bells” (1998, 42). 
 The Spanish organized the majority of the Filipino population around 
towns or church–plantation complexes called pueblos, were the people could be 
safely controlled by Catholic propaganda and employed in commercial 
agriculture or local artisanal production. Spanish friars were the ultimate power in 
the countryside but they shared power and profits with the maguinoos to better 
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cement their control. Indeed, Ileto suggests the success of the Spanish system 
depended in part on maintaining continuity with traditional Filipino customs and 
society, noting “The pattern of Filipino settlements–local churches as focal points 
of population concentrations…bears comparison with centers of population in the 
Indic states of Southeast Asia” (1998, 43). As Ileto explains,  
Reinforced by Hindu-Buddhist ideas of kinship, a ruler in the Indic states was a 
stable focal point for unification. His palace was a miniature Mount Meru; hi himself 
was the source of the kingdom’s well being–the abundance of its harvests, the extent 
of its trade relations, the glory of its name. What made all this possible in the first 
place was the notion that the ruler participated in divinity itself, represented by the 
supreme ancestor apotheosized as a Hindu god (1998, 43). 
 
  The Spanish often intentionally built new churches on the highest ground and 
promoted the idea of their extreme divinity to naturally take advantage of pre-
established social systems. 
 Staring in the late eighteenth century the economic and demographic 
situation began to shift in the Philippines. As Ileto explains, “increased economic 
opportunites, such as commerce in export crops, land speculation, and tax 
farming, brought to prominence a new class of Chinese mestizos” (1998, 43). 
These leaders eventually fused with the maguinoos a local governing class 
known as principales, who used their authority to amass wealth, land, and more 
power. As Spanish rule continued into the nineteenth century, the principales 
increasingly resented the colonial government and the Friars, who they viewed 
“as the remaining obstacles to their rise in power” (Ileto 1998, 43). 
 After the collapse of Spain’s rule in the Americas, Spanish administrators 
in Madrid sought to make the Philippines profitable by creating an export 
economy based on large-scale commercial agriculture, especially rice and hemp. 
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Madrid asserted direct control over many parts of the colony it had previously 
ignored, creating further resentment among the principales. Meanwhile these 
transformations in the island’s economy deprived Filipino farmers of their 
traditional land rights and created unemployment forcing many Filipino workers 
into debt peonage, extreme poverty or banditry. As Brian Linn explains, “By the 
1890s much of the Philippines was in severe distress, plagued by social tension, 
disease, hunger, banditry, and rebellion” (2000, 16). 
 As the nineteenth century transformed the Filipino economy, it also began 
to transform Filipino political and social consciousness. The children of elite 
principales increasingly travelled to Spain where they were educated and 
influenced by Spanish ideas and culture. By the 1870s these social interactions 
were birthing a new class of educated Filipino elites known as ilustrados, literally 
meaning “enlightened,” who unlike earlier generations of principales felt all 
Filipinos were entitled to the same rights as Spanish citizens. As Vincente Rafael 
explains, the ilustrados “were well-travelled and multi-lingual, though Spanish 
was the preferred lingua franca…From the 1880s to the middle of the 1890s they 
engaged in campaigns calling for reform of the economic, political and 
educational conditions in the Philippines” (1990, 594).  
 This peaceful reform campaign came to be known as the “Propaganda 
movement,” and it included a wide range of activities meant to disseminate and 
popularize Filipino nationalist thinking among all classes of Filipinos. Aside from 
organizing with other Filipino expatriates, Ilustrados also “wrote novels as well as 
philological, ethnological, and historical studies of the colony” and “publicized 
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nationalist causes in the liberal Spanish press and, from 1889–95, in their own 
propaganda newspaper, La Solidaridad” (Rafael 1990, 594). The movement, 
which was nominally led by author and poet Jose Rizal, initially “had an 
assimilationist nature,” calling for Filipinos to be granted equal rights as full 
Spanish citizens (Rafael 1990, 594). However, by 1896 the gradual 
assimilationist position had lost most of its appeal and supporters as it became 
clear Spain would not grant the Filipinos representation or even the same basic 
rights as Spanish citizens. The assimilationist position finally died in December 
1896 when the Spanish government executed Jose Rizal for sedition and treason 
shortly after the rebellion began, even though ironically he never advocated 
violent revolution (Rafael 1990, 594). 
 
Filipino geography, demographics and nationalism 
 
 The Philippines are a vast archipelago of over 7,600 islands east of the 
South China Sea in Southeast Asia. Comprising over 300,000 sq. kilometers, 
almost 95% of the land mass is broken up between the 11 largest islands. In the 
Northern group the largest and northernmost island of Luzon lies south of 
Taiwan. Manila is located in the center of Luzon and was and still is the largest 
city, port and capital.  Also in the northern island group south of Luzon are 
Mindoro and Masbate, as well as long and skinny Palawan jutting off towards 
Malaysian Borneo. The second largest island is Mindanao in the far south just 
north of Celebes. Relatively speaking only Luzon and Mindanao are very large, 
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each comprising about a third of the total Philippine landmass. The central 
Visayan island group consists of several islands much smaller than Luzon or 
Mindanao tightly packed together in shallow coastlines. These islands include 
Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Leyte and Samar. The terrain is dense with heavy 
jungles and steep mountains located in the center of most islands. There are 
beeches on most islands, but few large rivers, plains or open spaces. 
 By the 1890s the Philippines islands had a population of about seven 
million people, mostly concentrated on eight islands: Luzon, Panay, Cebu, Leyte, 
Bohol, Negros, Samar and Mindanao. Though figures somewhat vary, according 
to the last Spanish census taken in 1887, about 5.5 million Filipinos were 
Catholics, six to eight hundred thousand were polytheistic, three hundred 
thousand were Muslim, and seventy five thousand were Chinese (Halsted 1898, 
99-100). The vast majority of Catholic Filipinos belonged to four main ethnic sub-
groups: 3.2 million were Visayan, 1.5 million were Tagalog, eight hundred 
thousand were Ilocanos, and five hundred and fifty thousand were Bicols. The 
latter 3 groups were mostly located on the large island of Luzon, while the 
Visayans dominated the central island group of Panay, Cebu, Leyte, Bohol, 
Negros and Samar. The Muslims, known as Moros, controlled the southernmost 
island of Mindanao (Worcester 1914, 203).  
 The break down of traditional agriculture and local production naturally 
disrupted most Filipino’s political and social orientations and opened up new 
possibilities for how these orientations might be reconstructed. Indeed the idea of 
the Filipino nation is something largely derived out of years of colonial 
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development under Spanish rule, and subsequent resistance and opposition to 
that rule.  The ilustrados argued that freedom from formal Spanish rule would 
bring political, economic and social benefits Filipino people desired, and they 
helped construct a nationalist political discourse that both principales and Filipino 
peasants could use as vehicle for relief from loss of power, profits and 
livelihoods. Indeed, despite being very Europeanized relative to the average 
Filipino, Ileto argues the ilustrados were successful in part because like the 
Spanish colonizers they assimilated aspects of pre-nationalist Filipino culture into 
their late 19th century nationalist discourse. As Ileto observes, Rizal and the 
ilustrados were “definitely a product of the colonial order” that “through modern 
education, heralded the birth of modern Southeast Asian nationalism,” yet they 
also “generated meanings linked to other – largely hidden – narratives of the 
Philippine past” (Ileto 1998, 77-78). 
 While it is true that different classes and different ethnic groups on 
different islands perceived the “nation” differently, Rafael reminds us this is 
merely part of the natural process of nationalism being constantly defined and re-
defined. As Rafael adds, nationalism “reveals the mutability of all sorts of 
hierarchies. Rather than take power for granted as natural and inherited, 
nationalism asks about ‘rights’ and thereby opens up the problem of 
representation: who has the right to speak for whom and under what 
circumstances?” (Rafael 1990, 592)  
 Thus the wealthier land-owning principales usually favored formal 
independence with political rights and minor changes to the social system, while 
	 62	
lower-class peasants often wanted political independence and more substantial 
social reforms. Meanwhile Ilustrados and principales on different islands did not 
always have the same vision of what the future Philippine Republic would look 
like; elites from Luzon desired a centralized state and government organized 
around Manila, while elites from the Visayas favored a federated system titled 
towards local autonomy (Worcester 1914, 187).  
 However, nationalism was unifying in that by 1896 almost all groups 
opposed continued Spanish rule and desired to form some kind of new polity or 
polities in its place. Exactly how big the nation or nations were to be and who 
was to be included was a matter, like in Cuba, that could not be fully sorted out 
until after the colonial power was ejected from the islands. Linn questions 
whether the independence movement “represented an emergent Filipino 
nationalism or merely ethnic identity, class consciousness, an estrangement from 
Spain, and a desire for local autonomy,” but this is because instead of focusing 
on the “process” or “presence” of nationalism he is fixated on the idea that 
nationalism means fervent and unified belief in a simple and clear idea of a 
Filipino nation. Nationalism is not an end or fixed product, but the vehicle by 
which ethnic identity, class consciousness, estrangement from colonial powers 
and desire for local autonomy can express itself, and “when combined with the 
deterioration in living conditions, it represented a potent threat to Spanish rule” 





The Katipunan rebellion, Emilio Aguinaldo and the Treaty of Biak-na-Bato 
 
 Although ilustrado propaganda succeeded in raising awareness about the 
plight of Filipinos, it ultimately failed in getting the Spanish to change their 
policies. As a result, starting in the mid-1890’s Andres Bonifacio and many other 
Filipinos from the lower classes began organizing secret societies such as the 
Katipunan organization committed to total liberation of the islands. In 1896 
Spanish authorities began uncovering and arresting Katipunan members, 
compelling Bonifacio and the Katipunans to initiate their rebellion against the 
Spanish throughout Luzon. Most of the Spanish army at the time was busy in 
Cuba and most of the 18,000 Spanish troops in the Philippines were busy 
fighting the Moros on the southernmost island of Mindanao, so despite being 
disorganized and undersupplied, the rebels easily gained control over most of 
Luzon by the end of 1896. Initially many ilustrados and principales stayed out of 
the fighting, but the Katipunan’s successes compounded with national outrage 
over the poorly timed Spanish execution of Jose Rizal compelled most Filipino 
elites to join the fight by the end of year (Linn 2000, 17).  
 Despite his popularity and success, Bonifacio lacked political connections 
and resources and he was replaced by a well-connected principale named Emilio 
Aguinaldo in March 1897. Aguinaldo joined the Katipunans sometime in 1896 
before many members of his class revolted giving him somewhat more credibility 
among the lower classes. Nevertheless the fact that Bonifacio was quickly 
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arrested and mysteriously executed after Aguinaldo replaced him strongly 
suggests late-coming rebellious principales did not want their independence 
movement led by a potential social revolutionary. Max Boot, among others, 
argues Aguinaldo engineered Bonifacio’s execution, probably with the approval 
of other leading principales (2002, 103).  
 Indeed, John Larkin argues as a result of Bonifacio’s death “leadership [of 
the rebellion] passed into the hands of the Tagalog landed class” (1967, 312).  
As Linn explains, once Aguinaldo was in power he “called for political reforms 
that all Filipinos – or at least the elite – could agree on: the expulsion of the friars; 
representation in the Spanish Cortes; and an end to discriminatory laws” (2000, 
18). Nevertheless, Aguinaldo was still “the only person who could hold together 
the alliance of ilustrados, warlords, and local politicians that made up the 
nationalist leadership” and he consolidated the independence movement despite 
not sharing the same vision as all Filipinos (Linn 2000, 20). 
 By spring 1897 Spain had reinforced the island enough to begin its 
counteroffensive and Spanish regulars easily regained control of most towns and 
defeated rebels in open combat. The rebel infighting that resulted in Aguinaldo’s 
rise and Bonifacio’s death also helped Spain make quick progress. Although 
some rebels left the ranks to return home after the defeats, many joined 
Aguinaldo and other rebel leaders in the countryside in starting a guerilla 
campaign against the Spanish. As Spain had already discovered in Cuba, 
clearing out conventional rebel resistance was easy, but stamping out guerilla 
resistance was hard (Boot 2000, 103). 
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 Distracted by the growing disaster in Cuba, Madrid attempted to bargain 
with the Filipino rebels instead of trying to defeat them in their own element. In 
December of 1897 Spain signed the treaty of Biak-na-Bato with Aguinaldo, which 
promised future political reforms and gave Aguinaldo and ilustrado leadership a 
large bribe to stop fighting and leave the Philippine islands. Aguinaldo and the 
other leaders accepted the bribe with the intention of using it to buy weapons and 
re-organize the rebellion in Hong Kong. In the meantime rebel forces remained 
active throughout Luzon, demonstrating that guerilla resistance did not depend 
upon the presence of Filipino elites (Linn, CP 6; Larkin, 312). 
 
Archipelago wide rebellion, American entry, and the Treaty of Paris 
 
 Initially the rebellion was confined to the island of Luzon and most rebels 
were from the island’s dominant Tagalog ethnic group; however starting in early 
1898 secret societies on the islands of Panay and Negros began organizing for 
rebellion as well. Although many of the inhabitants of these islands were from 
different ethnic groups and not directly connected to Aguinaldo’s rebels, they 
shared a desire for autonomy if not outright independence from Spain. When the 
Spanish-American war began in April 1898 the Americans made contact with 
Aguinaldo’s group and transported them back to the Philippines to resume their 
campaign against the Spanish. The Americans destroyed the Spanish fleet in 
May, effectively isolating Spanish forces from further reinforcements and 
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supplies. Aguinaldo laid siege to Manila and Spanish control over the island 
quickly slipped away (Linn 2000, 20). As Linn explains, 
Suspicious of their Filipino troops, and with much of their manpower besieged 
by Aguinaldo in Manila, the Spanish garrisons in the provinces were isolated 
and soon capitulated. By the fall of 1898, military power in much of the 
archipelago was in the hands of regional Filipino forces, most of whom 
recognized Aguinaldo’s authority in principle if not in practice (1989, 6). 
 
 The first American troops landed on the island in late June 1898 and 
joined Aguinaldo’s forces in sieging Manila. However the alliance between the 
Americans and Filipinos did not last long. Just as in Cuba, Washington instructed 
American commanders not to recognize the rebel government. The McKinley 
administration decided most Filipinos were incapable of self-government and that 
only the United States could teach them how to be truly civilized and democratic. 
As Boot explains, “There were also more practical reasons for grabbing the 
Philippines. The race for colonies was in full swing, and the Americans feared 
that they would be locked out of the Asian market” (2002, 104).  
 Even more liberal and progressive Americans believed at the time it was 
cruel to leave citizens incapable of self-government at the mercy of any number 
of predatory imperialist powers. Disregarding the racist logic, there is some truth 
to the idea that Germany or Japan would have attempted to conquer the 
Philippines had the Americans simply left the islands. With the exception of 
Liberia, Ethiopia, Siam, Japan and (somewhat) China, virtually every other 
territory in the Eastern hemisphere was formally occupied by a European power 
or Japan between 1871 and 1914 (Linn 2000, 7-8).  
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 Nevertheless fears that the Philippines might be gobbled up by another 
major power should not obscure the fact that a powerful American imperialist 
lobby wanted the islands foremost for strategic and commercial reasons. In 1898 
they convinced the public that America had to become an imperialist power 
precisely to prevent other imperialist powers from locking them out of foreign 
markets. International law was still relatively underdeveloped and the delicate 
and volatile balance of global power meant the U.S. probably only had two 
choices: occupy the islands or let someone else do it.  
 Indeed even most anti-imperialists within the United States objected to 
annexing the islands on the grounds that the people there were racially inferior 
and could neither practice self-government nor be assimilated into American 
political culture, thus it is doubtful the United States would have done much to 
help preserve the Philippine Republic against potential German or Japanese 
invasion. Most Americans at the time were primarily concerned with finding new 
markets to alleviate cycles of overproduction and depression and maintaining 
their own domestic racist order; spreading or supporting a cosmopolitan concept 
of liberalism to non-white peoples was largely at odds with both objectives (Boot 
2002, 105–107).  
 As the rebels became increasingly aware of U.S. intentions, relations 
between the two groups rapidly deteriorated. In August 1898 American forces 
“attacked” Manila in what many observers at the time reported was really a 
mock-battle between the Spanish garrison and American forces. By this point the 
Spanish-American War was basically over and both the Spanish and Americans 
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wanted U.S. troops to take control of the city without the help of the Filipinos and 
with the intention of keeping them out of Manila. Boot explains,  
The commanders of the Spanish soldiers trapped inside the capital had no desire to 
fight, but feared the consequences should their former subjects take over. So they 
negotiated an elaborate hoax with Admiral Dewey whereby U.S. troops would lob a 
few shells into Manila and then the Spanish could surrender. The sham “battle” of 
Manila occurred on August 13 1898 (2002, 105).   
 
 In response the rebel army decided to maintain the siege around Manila 
leaving the old city and port to be controlled by the American expeditionary force. 
Tensions between the Americans and Filipino rebels continued to build until 
December 1898 when, as part of the Treaty of Paris, the U.S. agreed to buy the 
Philippine islands from Spain. By this point it was clear to the rebels that the 
Americans meant to occupy and even conquer the islands if necessary (Linn 
2000, 8-10).  
 However, the actual war between the Americans and Filipino rebels did 
not begin until early February 1899. Justifiably concerned about the intentions of 
the United States, Aguinaldo and the ilustrados began to realize their last hope of 
avoiding a war was that anti-imperialists in the United States could convince the 
Senate to reject the Treaty of Paris and U.S. acquisition of the islands. Seeing as 
the treaty was eventually ratified by a margin of one vote, this was not an 
unreasonable hope.  
 Most fortunately for the McKinley administration fighting somehow broke 
out between American and Filipino forces outside of Manila mere days before the 
Senate voted to ratify the treaty, effectively creating a state of war before the final 
vote could force the issue. The Americans had just demolished the Spanish 
military and thus were confident they could do much better against Filipino rebels 
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than a declining Spain had. However, the Americans were about to discover the 
Filipino Liberation Army’s conventional strength formed a first line of defense 
only, and in the guerilla phase of the war, massive superiority in conventional 
strength counted for very little (Linn 2000, 11-12). 
 
Section II: Conventional Operations February 1899–November 1899 
 
The Army of Liberation, Battle for Manila and Filipino military weakness 
 
 The war started outside Manila on February 4th 1899, two days before the 
U.S. Senate ratified the Treaty of Paris by one vote. The Americans occupied 
Manila since August 1898 while Filipino rebel forces maintained siege positions 
around the city waiting for the Americans to act.  A confrontation between an 
American and Filipino soldier resulted in the American killing his Filipino 
counterpart and reporting to his comrades that the city was under attack. Some 
historians have claimed the Americans orchestrated the whole affair as a pretext 
to create a state of war before the treaty was signed, but whatever the truth the 
incident was enough to start a full scale battle outside Manila (Boot 2002, 106).  
 Both sides built up their strength in the months leading up to the Battle of 
Manila, but the Americans benefited much more from the build up as they had 
much better equipment and better trained and supplied troops than the rebels. 
The Americans had 20,000 troops in the greater Manila area, 11,000 of which 
manned the front lines facing the Filipinos. To counter them the Filipino 
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Liberation Army had 80,000 troops in the vicinity, with 20,000 of their best troops 
manning the system of trenches besieging the Americans in Manila. The Filipinos 
had twice as many men defending well–prepared positions, but it did not stop the 
Americans from attacking the Filipino trenches on February 5th. As discussed in 
the Cuban chapter, late 19th century rifle technology was deadly and accurate, 
making frontal assaults against disciplined entrenched troops suicide. Fortunately 
for American soldiers Filipino troops were neither accurate nor disciplined (Boot 
2002, 108).    
 Unlike many Cuban leaders and soldiers, most Filipino rebels had very 
little experience fighting and virtually none in open conventional combat. 
Comparatively speaking most of the 40,000 Cubans who fought against Spain 
were probably little better trained and supplied than their average Filipino 
counterpart. However unlike the Filipinos, Cuban rebels benefited from the 
presence of veteran guerilla commanders and several thousand fighters who 
gained valuable experience in the Ten Years War. Cuban veterans were unable 
to win open combats against Spanish regulars, but unlike the FAL, they were 
able to bloody and repulse their opponent when defending preparing positions. 
Unlike the Cubans, the Filipinos did not have enough veteran leadership or 
fighters and as a result the FAL “suffered from a lack of trust and coherence” 
(Linn 2000, 62). 
 Consequently when the serious conventional fighting began around 
Manila the Americans easily defeated the numerically superior Filipino forces. 
Many Filipino fighters lacked both shoes and rifles, and even though the 
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American army was largely comprised of state volunteer units, the Filipinos “had 
even less training” (Boot 2002, 108). Indeed many soldiers with rifles didn’t know 
how to use them, lacking basic knowledge of “how to use their sights” (Boot 
2002, 108). At the Battle of Manila the FAL had more weapons, supplies and 
troops than at any other point during the war, but they failed to win a defensive 
battle with 2:1 odds and failed to cause the Americans significant casualties in 
the process.  Indeed, the battle was such a disaster for the Filipinos that rebel 
commanders began to fear that if Filipino Liberation Army faced another open 
battle against the Americans it might simply melt away (Linn 2000, 62-64). 
 
A hybrid rebel strategy and American economic warfare 
 
 The crushing defeat outside Manila placed Aguinaldo and other rebellious 
ilustrados in a difficult position. The battle cost the FAL valuable manpower and 
supplies that could not be easily replaced. The American naval blockade made 
the prospects of future arms shipments especially dim. However the immediate 
problem was the FAL’s abysmal battlefield performance in such favorable 
circumstances, which made it difficult to expect any conventional military success 
in the future. Some of Aguinaldo’s advisors urged him to abandon his desire to 
renew a conventional campaign, but Aguinaldo and the rebel government 
remained determined to fight in the open if they could (Linn 2000, 136).  
 Politically any chance of international recognition depended on the 
Republic maintaining a standing Army and seat of government, although this did 
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not preclude guerilla activity entirely. Essentially rebel strategy called for Filipinos 
to fight conventionally until defeated and overrun by American forces, at which 
point they would switch to resisting occupation with purely guerilla tactics. Right 
after the war began in February the rebels divided up the islands into various 
command zones, each with its own local rebel governance, economy and 
guerillas. Indeed, in many areas the Americans did not realize they were 
appointing officials to important government positions who were actually rebels 
(Linn 2000, 137-138). 
 Not surprisingly the Americans implemented counterinsurgency measures 
long before the actual conventional war ended and the purely guerilla phase 
started. Quickly realizing the rebels were drawing resources from inside the 
American zone of control, the Army heavily restricted trade and movement 
around Manila and other large population centers in order to deprive the 
Liberation Army of food or any material resource that could help them. As Linn 
astutely notes, “The Manila garrison’s early and escalating efforts at food 
restriction would make it much easier for officers outside the city to impose far 
more draconian policies of food deprivation and destruction” (2000, 93). 
 It did not take long for more draconian policies of destruction to develop. 
In March 1899 General Otis dispatched forces to clear out rebels and punish 
peasants supporting the rebellion south of Manila. The American commander, 
General Llyod Wheaton, fought under Sherman during the Civil War, and he 
zealously introduced his mentor’s method of war to the Philippines. By the end of 
the weeklong campaign one correspondent with the army noted, “the once fertile 
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countryside was now desolate – crops trampled, farms and houses burned, 
towns blackened and depopulated.” As Linn concludes, “Whether as retaliation or 
to create a ‘dead zone’ to protect the southern lines, it was a harsh measure that 
fell chiefly on people who had committed no acts of war” (2000, 93-95). 
 Interestingly, General Wheaton’s campaign of destruction did not gone 
unnoticed by officials in Washington, so American forces across the islands were 
given much stricter orders to respect private property and do their best to 
demonstrate the benevolent nature of American occupation. As American 
General Arthur MacArthur observed to his troops, “To exasperate individuals or 
to burn or loot unprotected houses or property is not only criminal in itself, but 
tends to impede the policy of the United States and to defeat the very purpose 
which the Army is here to accomplish” (Linn 2000, 103-105). Politically the 
Americans wanted to appear as the protectors of individual liberty and property; 
however waging a war of occupation often forced them to compromise their 
liberal ideals. 
 In addition to the efforts of the Army, the U.S. Navy vigorously blockaded 
trade throughout the archipelago. All ports but Manila, Iloilo City and Cebu City 
were closed to trade, and all waterborne trade throughout the island group had to 
flow through these ports or risk being seized as contraband. Because so few 
ports remained open and because the contraband list prohibited the trade of 
basic necessities and foodstuffs, including rice and fish, inter-island trade was 
almost impossible for most of 1899. Thus while the blockade did damage the 
rebel cause by preventing inter-island communication and trade, it also created 
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food shortages throughout the Philippines. Admiral John Watson, commander of 
American naval forces, even questioned the legality of the blockade. Local 
principales warned the Americans the blockade might drive some Filipinos into 
the rebel camp, and even General Otis “noted it left many areas without food and 
badly undercut the revival of commerce, ad thus greatly increased the problems 
of reestablishing order and prosperity on the islands” (Linn 2000, 130-131). 
 
Conventional American victory and the start of guerilla operations 
 
  Despite ominous signs of guerilla resistance on the Visayan Islands, the 
American commander General Otis continued to believe the only real threat to 
American occupation were Tagalog Filipino rebels on Luzon. After the defeat at 
Manila, Aguinaldo and part of the Liberation Army retreated north to Malolos, 
which was serving as Philippine Republic’s capital. As Linn observes, “In 
conventional military thinking, the north held the enemy’s centers of gravity: its 
government, its commander in chief, its capital city, and its army. The destruction 
of all – or, in Otis’s optimistic mind – any of these could end the war quickly and 
painlessly” (Linn 2000, 88). 
 The Americans began their northern offensive towards the end of March 
1899. U.S. forces quickly occupied a burned-out Malolos but were unable to trap 
the Liberation Army. The Americans were still embracing a conventional mindset 
but the rebels preferred to torch their capital rather than risk loosing their army to 
defend it. Indeed General Luna, commander of the Liberation Army, ordered 
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rebel troops to burn most towns and supply centers as they retreated, making it 
clear both sides were rapidly becoming committed to Total War (Linn 2000, 95-
100). 
 The American columns renewed their advance, finding the Liberation 
Army entrenched in prepared positions. As usual, the Americans defeated such 
positions by outflanking, outgunning or simply directly assaulting them. More 
concerning for the rebels, the defeats were beginning to severely drain their 
manpower. Filipino forces frequently suffered ten times as many casualties in 
pitched combats with heavily armed American troops. Once again the battles 
proved in conventional warfare the Liberation Army was incapable of defending 
strong positions or making the Americans pay for taking them (Linn 2000, 105-
108). 
 As a result of the Liberation Army’s poor battlefield performance and 
inability to protect Manila or Malolos, some ilustrados and principales began to 
defect to the Americans. Towards the end of April Aguinaldo asked the 
Americans to agree to a three-week armistice, but the Americans did not want to 
grant the rebels time or diplomatic recognition and refused. In May the American 
columns resumed their advance, blooding and dispersing rebel defenders while 
capturing several towns and rebel supply stores, including the valuable rail line at 
San Fernando. In the middle of May American forces captured the relocated 
rebel capital of San Isidro, another “easy and barren victory” in the view of one 
accompanying war correspondent (Linn 2000, 115).  
	 76	
 The Americans captured some territory and several strong defensive 
positions during the spring, but the gains had no real strategic importance. 
Worse, during the summer of 1899 consistent rebel activity throughout American 
“zones of control” demonstrated just how fragile and hallow those gains were. 
The American line was full of holes and smaller garrisons were always in danger 
of being isolated and besieged by local rebel forces. As Linn explains, throughout 
July and August, “Small enemy detachments moved with relative impunity 
through the gaps; indeed, guerrillas operated all the way to the outskirts of 
Manila, harassing supply columns, cutting telegraph wires, sniping at soldiers, 
and, perhaps most serious, intimidating any civilians inclined to cooperate with 
the invaders” (Linn 2000, 122-123). 
 After the spring campaign the Liberation Army shrank to about 4,000 men. 
Aguinaldo increasingly feared General Luna would take control of the Army, so 
he had Luna assassinated in early June. Luna was not a very good tactician, but 
he did inspire some confidence in his men, making his death an unfortunate loss 
for such a demoralized army. The final conventional American offensive began in 
October 1899, and within two months the American army effectively crippled the 
Army of Liberation’s ability to continue even limited operations. By this point the 
rebels realized the futility of continuing conventional resistance – in nine months 
of fighting they failed to hold any defensive positions or score any tactical 
victories against the Americans. Thus in mid-November Aguinaldo dissolved the 
Army of Liberation and ordered all rebels to disperse and begin purely guerilla 
operations. Fittingly the conventional phase of the war ended not with a climactic 
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battle but with the Liberation Army and many of its commanders melting away 
into the countryside where they would become “Amigos” by day and guerillas by 
night (Linn 2000, 144-158). 
 
Section III: Guerilla Warfare November 1899–July 1902 
 
Guerilla strategy and Visayan resistance 
 
 Although Filipino resistance was generally decentralized and 
uncoordinated after 1899, Aguinaldo and the rebel government did provide 
general outlines. Guerillas throughout the archipelago received three primary 
directives from Luzon: wage a war of attrition using guerilla tactics, prevent 
Filipinos from collaborating with the American military and government, and 
launch a general offensive in the fall of 1900 with the hopes of influencing the 
American Presidential election. As Linn notes, in many ways the shift in strategy 
was subtle – from the beginning the rebels had been using guerilla tactics, but 
such methods were initially viewed as a last resort and secondary to 
conventional resistance. From 1900 on guerilla tactics became primary to the 
rebels’ strategy (Linn 2000, 185-186). 
 Instead of attacking or defending conventionally important locations, 
rebels focused on attacking random and isolated areas, and only when they had 
“overwhelming superiority.” The new goal was simply to preserve weapons and 
troops and prolong the fighting as long as possible, which naturally became 
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much easier once the rebels abandoned all conventional military goals. In 1899 
the rebels wasted manpower trying to take or hold conventionally important 
positions; adopting a purely guerilla strategy allowed the rebels to preserve their 
troops and weapons by only engaging in lighting quick ambushes or combats 
and melting away into terrain full of geographic obstacles and bobby-traps (Linn 
2000, 187-189).  
 The Americans wanted to believe only ethnic Tagalog Filipinos from Luzon 
would resist them, but they quickly discovered the reality was much different. In 
early 1898 Filipinos from the Visayan Islands rebelled against Spain 
independently of Aguinaldo’s Liberation Army, which should have been enough 
to indicate their probable stance towards indefinite American occupation. After 
the victory at Manila, American forces waiting off the coast of Panay demanded 
armed rebel forces controlling the valuable Visayan port of Iloilo City surrender 
within four days or face bombardment and assault. Keeping their word, the U.S. 
Navy bombarded and occupied the city in mid-February, forcing rebel militants to 
disperse and take to the countryside. Combined with acts of rebel arson, the 
combat virtually destroyed Iloilo City, but it did nothing to prevent the widespread 
guerilla resistance that soon materialized across the Visayan island group (Linn 
2000, 67-69). 
 American forces landed on Negros and Cebu in the spring of 1899 
meeting similar guerilla resistance on both islands. Although Filipino rebels in the 
Visayan Islands sometimes operated in the open due to American manpower 
shortages, unlike the Liberation Army on Luzon, rebels in the Visayas almost 
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always declined conventional battle. General Martin Delgado, commander of the 
rebel forces on Panay, attacked a small American garrison in early March, in 
which less than a quarter of Filipino troops even had rifles. Predictably the 
heavily armed and fortified American troops easily defeated and repulsed the 
attack, causing enough casualties in the process to prevent Delgado from taking 
future offensives (Linn 2000, 70-71).  
 The Americans easily gained control of most towns and ports as well as 
the support of most local principales but they couldn’t secure the vast majority of 
the countryside or find and defeat most rebel forces. In a sign of things to come, 
the American commander on Panay blockaded the island and strictly controlled 
the distribution of foodstuffs in an attempt to starve the rebels into submission. By 
August 1899 this measure doubled the Filipino population living in the American 
safe zone on Panay, however the American commander astutely realized the 
new refugees were not truly loyal to American governance. More to the point it 
also indicated a substantial amount of Filipinos were inclined to resist American 
pacification, so long as they could sustain their basic material needs. After the 
Americans occupied a town, most principales willingly collaborated and claimed 
to speak for the general population. Inevitably, however, guerilla resistance 
would develop in the back country of most islands, indicating the population was 
rarely as loyal and pro-American as the principales wanted American troops 
believe (Linn 2000, 72). 
 By late December 1899 General Otis felt confident that “war in its proper 
meaning had ceased to exist.” Between January and February 1900 the army 
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was dispersed throughout the archipelago in order to establish American 
governance and restart the Philippine economy. Brief campaigns in southern 
Luzon and Panay cleaned up remnants of conventional resistance, while 
expeditions to the hemp ports in southeastern Luzon and the islands of Samar 
and Leyte established American presence throughout the archipelago. As a 
result some restrictions on interisland trade were lifted and the valuable hemp 
trade was renewed. However by loosening the blockade the Americans also 
helped Filipino rebels gain foodstuffs and taxes, indicating American economic 
warfare was not without effect or utility (Linn, 2000, 164-181). 
 
Principales for McKinley, Amigos for Bryan 
 
 The Americans did not suffer their first real setback until the purely guerilla 
phase of the war began. In early December rebel agents from Luzon landed on 
Negros and managed to restart the uprising there, partly by assuring local 
residents that William Jennings Bryan was going to defeat McKinley in the 
upcoming Presidential election and grant the Philippines independence. The 
promise that a Bryan victory would lead to Philippine independence was one of 
the rebels main recruiting tools and propaganda points throughout 1900. Bryan 
was a Democrat from Kansas and he campaigned on an anti-imperialist platform, 
so the rebels spread as much propaganda as possible assuring Filipinos that 
Bryan would win and the Americans would then leave. Aguinaldo even intensified 
guerilla activity in the months leading up to the election (Boot 2002, 113-114). 
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 The principales of Negros remained loyal to the Americans, but the 
majority of the population remained loyal to the rebellion. The affair on Negros 
demonstrated the differences between Tagalogs and Visayans were not so great 
as those between Filipino elites and peasants. After a month long campaign the 
Americans disrupted and scattered the rebels, but only the continued presence of 
an American garrison kept the situation stable. The principales had previously 
assured American forces they were speaking for or at least had control over the 
majority of the island’s inhabitants, yet as Linn notes, “three revolutionary agents 
and a small force of riflemen had been able to gather sufficient support there for 
an uprising” (Linn 2000, 172-173). 
 Before the war the Americans argued only a small group of ilustrados and 
principales desired independence, but the rebellion actually received most of its 
support from lower-class Filipinos. Unfortunately for the Americans, interactions 
with Filipinos did little to clarify the situation. The only source of information the 
Americans had was from the principales, and years of telling the Spanish exactly 
what they wanted to hear had prepared them well. Of course the fact that most 
Americans perceived Filipinos as being incapable of self-government made the 
false narrative the principales gave them easy to adopt. Finally as conventional 
resistance collapsed, many initially rebellious principales defected to the 
American side, further enabling “the American government to belittle the 
resistance that still raged,” and to “depreciate the leaders of the resistance by 
categorizing them as heads of minority groups or to malign them as bandits” 
(Constantino 1972, 237-238). 
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  These assertions became harder to support as the war went on and 
tenacious guerilla resistance continued. By late January 1900, American troops 
were already reporting signs that the rebels were establishing secret government 
and military organizations throughout the islands. Different rebel groups did not 
always coordinate their resistance but they were always unified in their 
resistance to foreign rule and their desire for self-government. Aguinaldo’s 
government had little authority in the countryside, indicating Filipino peasants 
throughout the islands didn’t need to be motivated or centrally coordinated to risk 
their lives, and eventually their families lives and property as well. Moreover 
guerilla activity was not limited to the countryside. As Linn observes, “Many 
townspeople were active allies of the guerillas in the field, hiding weapons and 
providing food and shelter, ready at any time to attack the garrison” (Linn 2000, 
181). 
 
Archipelago-wide guerilla warfare and Benevolent Assimilation 
 
 General Otis believed the war was over and his mission fulfilled, so he 
requested to be relieved in April 1900. Though Otis never fully acknowledged the 
scale of resistance to American occupation, even he was forced to concede in 
his final report, “Guerrilla and robber bands still quite active in various sections of 
islands and considerable element [of the] natives untrustworthy” (1902, 1148). 
Indeed Otis had to admit at least some of the armed groups still fighting were 
guerrillas, though Otis still characterized resistance by the general population as 
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“untrustworthiness” more than political activity. His replacement, General Arthur 
MacArthur, eventually came to a very different conclusion about the situation.  
 By the time MacArthur took command of American forces in May 1900 
they were dispersed throughout the islands engaged in “Benevolent 
Assimilation,” President McKinley’s term for highlighting the positive U.S. 
intentions behind the occupation. Over the course of year the Americans 
substantially increased the number of garrisons from 53 in November 1899 to 
413 by October 1900 (Linn 2000, 199). The Americans improved the lives of 
many Filipinos with their peaceful pacification efforts, establishing municipal 
governments and encouraging economic activity. Linn notes that even by early 
1900, “Roads and bridges, schools, new marketplaces, improved drainage and 
sanitation, and other signs of progress where everywhere” (2000, 208).  
 However, these improvements did little to slow down rebel activity, and 
given the likelihood that many Filipino officials worked for both sides, they 
possibly even aided the rebel cause at times. While things were relatively quiet 
during February and March 1900, rebel activity spiked throughout the islands 
during April. Heavy fighting broke out on Luzon, Samar, Leyte and Mindanao. 
Most ominously starting in April the Americans began fighting more engagements 
and suffering more casualties then they had during the conventional war (Linn 
2000, 208-209). 
 Towards the beginning of the guerilla campaign most American troops 
viewed the rebels as an external threat to their garrison, but what they did not 
realize was that many of the townspeople were in fact working for the rebels. 
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Most American military and government personnel were initially blind to the 
threat because they wanted to believe Filipinos welcomed their presence and the 
end of conventional hostilities meant the end of all hostilities. This allowed rebel 
shadow governments to operate all throughout the islands, “collecting taxes, 
recruiting soldiers, maintaining morale, and administering justice more efficiently 
than could its American-sponsored counterpart” (Linn 2000, 191). The fact that 
the rebel war effort was so decentralized was another advantage for them 
because individual American successes meant little and “there were no key 
supply routes for the Americans to interdict or sanctuaries to invade” (Linn 2000, 
192). 
 MacArthur realized the rebels were far from defeated and understood 
Benevolent Assimilation alone would not be able to convince them to stop 
fighting. By the end of May MacArthur thought the decision to disperse the Army 
throughout the islands had been a mistake, thus he outlined a plan to 
concentrate American forces into larger columns that could sweep the 
countryside. However this was no longer practically possible because the 
garrisons were critical to maintaining control of the towns and protecting Filipinos 
collaborating with the Americans. Yet even if the Americans had employed 
MacArthur’s strategy it is doubtful it would have succeeded, because it still rested 
on the false premise that guerilla resistance had a center of gravity that could be 
found and destroyed. Trying a different track in June 1900 the Americans offered 
a general amnesty to any rebels that surrendered, but this too yielded meager 
results (Linn 2000, 210-211).  
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 The monsoon season made campaigning impossible during the summer 
of 1900, but by the fall of 1900 the Americans had 70,000 troops on the island 
ready to operate in the dry season. As planned by Aguinaldo and the rebel 
government, rebel groups on several islands carried out successful attacks 
against isolated American garrisons in an attempt to influence the American 
Presidential election. Although they were unable to help Bryan win the election, 
contrary to the prognostications of many American jingoes McKinley’s re-election 
did not bring the war to an end either. More importantly the relative success of 
the rebels’ general offensive convinced the Americans it was time to complement 
their policy of Benevolent Assimilation with a harsher form of warfare. MacArthur 
dispensed with the fiction that the people they were fighting were primarily 
bandits, observing in his annual report for 1900 that there was “considerable 
evidence” the bandits actually attacked the guerillas and the guerillas were trying 
to protect the population from them. In the same report MacArthur persuasively 
argued: 
The success of this unique system of war depends upon almost complete unity of 
action of the entire native population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit 
of discussion; how it is brought about and maintained is not so plain. Intimidation has 
undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, but fear, as the only motive, is hardly 
sufficient to account for the united and apparently spontaneous action of several 
millions of people (PIS, Pt. 10, 24, 62-63). 
 
 There was no doubt the rebels threatened, kidnapped and assassinated 
other Filipinos who collaborated with the Americans, but as MacArthur 
understood, this was not enough to explain the level of resistance the occupation 
experienced. General Robert Hughes, who served as Otis’ chief of staff and later 
directly in the field, concurred with MacArthur’s sentiments: “The whole 
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population has been rank insurrectos from hide to heart, and all have been 
contributing to the support of the cause in one way or another to their ability” 
(PIS, pt. 11, 33). Considering both men exercised high command and fought 
throughout the archipelago, their estimation of the level of Filipino resistance the 
United States faced is worth trusting.  
 
Martial law, harsh warfare, and concentration camps 
 
 At the beginning of the war Washington gave American occupation forces 
strict orders to respect the lives and property of all Filipinos; however the Army 
was also authorized to take more extreme measures against guerilla activity, 
which the U.S. still viewed as criminal and outside the conventional laws of war. 
According to western international law at the time, occupying armies had 
responsibilities to treat civilians well but civilians also had a duty not to resist 
occupation. According to contemporary U.S. military regulations, “combatants not 
in uniform would be treated like ‘highway robbers or pirates’ and, along with 
civilians who aided them, they could be subject to the death penalty” (Boot 2002, 
116).  
 Nevertheless between February 1899 and November 1900 U.S. 
leadership emphasized protecting Filipino lives and property and avoiding severe 
punishments, although individual American commanders and troops sometimes 
destroyed property and executed prisoners (Linn 2002, 212-213). However by 
late 1900, most American field commanders felt they were engaged in what they 
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frequently termed as “Indian-style warfare,” which they viewed as savage and 
outside the normal rules of war conventional war. Americans won the west by 
harassing, relocating and often directly targeting Native American civilians, so 
they decided to employ a similar strategy against the Filipinos. Indeed, 26 of the 
30 U.S. generals who fought in the Philippines had experience fighting Indians in 
North America where they gained “invaluable experience” in irregular warfare 
(Boot 2002, 127). 
 Starting in December 1900 the Americans declared martial law and issued 
a proclamation throughout the islands declaring guerilla warfare to be illegal and 
punishable by death. As a result American courts began sending prisoners to the 
gallows “with far more regularity” (Linn 2002, 213). Those considered guilty of 
materially supporting the rebels were fined, imprisoned, and had their property 
confiscated, and the Americans often held them until they gave information or 
their relatives were captured. Even people only suspected of rebel sympathies 
could have their rents suspended and property seized. Prominent principales 
who had yet to openly declare for the Americans were told to do so or become 
enemies of the United States. Unsurprisingly, this shift in strategy caused 
massive destruction throughout the islands. As Linn explains,  
“Despite MacArthur’s injunctions to avoid unnecessary hardship, he tolerated, even 
encouraged, campaigns that can only be described as punitive. Crop and property 
destruction, euphemistically called ‘burning,’ became far more common; and there 
was less effort to ensure that only property clearly used by the insurgents was 
torched…areas were systematically devastated to deprive the guerillas of food and 
punish their supporters“ (2000, 213-215). 
 
 The Americans implemented one final measure to their counterinsurgency 
campaign: concentrating the rural population of certain provinces into protected 
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American zones. The U.S. Army had previously employed concentration camps 
or “reservations” to wage war against the American Indians, “in order to separate 
the insurgents from the population base” (Boot 2002, 124). Anyone found outside 
of these safe zones was considered an enemy combatant and could be punished 
as such.  
 As Linn observes they were harsh methods but they worked – between 
December 1900 and July 1901 “the army conducted a series of regional 
campaigns that ended armed resistance in twenty-one of the thirty-eight 
rebellious provinces” (2000, 214). Interestingly, “MacArthur increased press 
censorship so that word of his tough tactics would not get out” (Boot 2002, 116), 
although unlike Cuban rebels, Filipinos did not have significant contacts or 
sympathies within the international press. Though it is difficult to make an exact 
estimate, probably around 200,000 Filipinos died in concentration camps during 
and after the war (Boot 2002, 125). 
 After July 1901 substantial rebel forces remained active only in southern 
Luzon and Samar, though Aguinaldo was not captured until November 1901. 
Nevertheless despite the success of the Americans’ new pacification program 
and the capture or surrender of most prominent rebel leaders by November, the 
war still lasted until July 1902, yet another indication rebel activity was never 
dependent upon principale leadership and coordination (Linn 2000, 215-219).  
 American forces waged the final two campaigns in Southern Luzon and 
Samar with particular ferocity. The wanton killing of prisoners and non-
combatants on Samar “provided ample ammunition for critics of the Army” and 
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led Senate hearings and court martials. In Batangas province in Southern Luzon, 
the U.S. Army rounded up 300,000 inhabitants into concentration camps and 
scoured the countryside “destroying all foodstuffs and capturing or killing all able-
bodied men” (Boot 2002, 124). The U.S. press heavily criticized the Army for 
using the same tactics they had previously decried the Spanish for using. As 
Boot observes, “It was true. Confronted with a native insurgency, the U.S. had 



















CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS 
 
How many nationalists does it take to start a rebellion? 
 
 Whether or not these wars are indicative of “national resistance” remains 
for some authors a subject of historical contention. As Linn observes, the rebel 
government in Luzon was effectively a centralized Tagalog oligarchy, whose 
elitist policies “weakened their authority in the countryside” and left them at odds 
with Filipinos outside of Luzon who “favored a federal government with 
considerable provincial autonomy” (Linn 2000, 323).  
 
 CUBA THE PHILLIPINES 
Total Population 1,700,000 7,000,000 
Total Rebel Fighters 40,000 150,000 
% Total Pop. Fighting 2% 2% 
Total Fighters Killed 9,000 16,000 
% Fighters K.I.A. 23% 11% 
Total Civilians Killed 170,000 200,000 
% Total Pop. Killed 10% 3% 
Table 1 (Rebel fighter and general population statistics) 
 
 However, Linn misses the point that nationalist guerilla resistance does 
not require coordination or a politically unified population to be effective. To the 
contrary both wars suggest that a committed core of fighters and civilian 
supporters is more than enough start a nationalist rebellion irrespective of how 
the general population feels. Indeed as Table 2 shows above, only 2% of the 
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Cuban and Filipino population took up arms during the rebellions. As we can also 
see, both wars inflicted far more death upon the general population than 
combatants. 
 
FEATURE CUBA THE PHILIPPINES 
Conventional resistance? NO YES 
Guerilla resistance? YES YES 
Tactical success? YES NO 
Strategic success? YES YES 
Open borders/coasts? YES NO 
Popular support YES YES 
Elite support YES NO 
Foreign arms/military support? YES NO 
Ethnic/religious divisions NO YES 
Racial divisions? YES YES 
Guerilla economic war? YES NO 
Occupier economic war? YES YES 
Guerilla total war? YES YES 
Occupier total war? YES YES 
Table 2 (Selected features of both wars) 
 
The failure of benevolent counterinsurgency and need for “harsh warfare” 
 
 Linn argues the American effort in the Philippines was “the most 
successful counterinsurgency campaign in U.S. history,” adding that “Given the 
recent interventions into internecine regional struggles, the history of the 
Philippine War has much to offer both civilian and military leaders” (2000, 328). 
However, American counterinsurgency strategy was successful in the Philippines 
because it denied the Filipinos foreign support and it directly and indiscriminately 
targeted and punished civilians in war zones. 
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 U.S. counterinsurgency tactics underwent two phases during the war. 
During the first phase between February 1899 and December 1900 the United 
States attempted to counter the rebels by dispersing their forces throughout the 
islands in local garrisons, much like the Spanish had during 1895 in Cuba. Unlike 
the Spanish, however, the Americans made serious efforts to win over the 
population with McKinley’s program of benevolent assimilation. The McKinley 
administration hoped by providing local governance and civil rights, while building 
schools, roads and improving other badly neglected infrastructure, they could win 
Filipinos over to the benefits of American rule. These efforts were not entirely 
fruitless but they were wholly inadequate by themselves to end the rebellion.   
 Starting in December 1900 the Americans shifted strategy towards 
attacking the rebels’ support and infrastructure, which quite simply meant treating 
all Filipinos in active combat zones as potential hostiles or enemy combatants. 
Thus during the second phase of the war, between December 1900 and July 
1902, the Americans adopting a much more aggressive counterinsurgency 
program that emphasized punishing civilians perceived to be supporting the 
rebels. During this phase of the war, many non-combatant Filipino civilians lost 
their jobs, property, and personal freedom. Finally in 1901 these policies 
culminated in adopting a reconcentration policy similar to the Spanish in Cuba, 
forcibly removing civilians out of the countryside into concentration camps in 
American zones of control (Linn, PW 199-200). 
 Successful Spanish counterinsurgency strategies also indiscriminately 
targeted civilians, and their methods “almost destroyed the Cuban independence 
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movement, along with a great part of the Cuban population” (Tone, 234). 
However, paradoxically the Spanish discovered that while targeting civilians 
proved effective at slowly defeating the insurgency, it also attracted what 
guerillas need most: international attention and assistance. 
 
Foreign assistance critical to guerilla success 
 
 Nationalism provides guerilla warfare with the popular support it needs to 
sustain a long-term strategy of attrition against foreign colonial occupiers, but 
nationalist guerilla resistance requires foreign assistance to successfully defeat 
the occupier. Rebel forces can gain foreign support in three main ways. First, 
rebels can acquire vital shipments of arms, munitions and supplies from abroad. 
Second, rebel governments-in-arms can seek diplomatic recognition and/or 
belligerent status, making it easier to borrow money and purchase weapons 
while providing the rebel cause with additional moral support. This can also 
pressure the occupying nation to consider negotiating or leaving altogether. 
Third, rebels can gain conventional military support from a friendly foreign 
government openly hostile to the occupying power. While both rebellions lasted 
several years and received substantial amounts of popular support, Cuban rebels 
benefited from all three types of foreign assistance, while Filipinos received only 
minimal amounts of the first kind.  
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 Recent scholarship on counter-insurgency strategy emphasizes the 
importance of this point. In his 2012 work, The Counter-Insurgency Myth, military 
theorist Andrew Mumford argues: 
The level of external support insurgent groups receive has proved itself to be a 
critical enabler of insurgent success. An absence of exogenous funding and 
weaponry has stunted insurgencies and fatally undermined their potency. Arguably 
external insurgent support is more important to the effectiveness of an insurgent 
group than the level of internal support it receives amongst its own population. An 
armed group without weapons is irrelevant, yet an armed group with minimal popular 
support is still an armed group. The security threat remains (2012, 151). 
 
 Although U.S. officials did stop some ships from bringing men, weapons 
and supplies to Cuba, they usually let everyone go and – most importantly – 
returned the seized assets. The Spanish navy was not large and the Cuban 
coastline was long and full of landing spots, so Cuba effectively had an open 
border that the rebels could always use to bring in more weapons and supplies 
(Tone 2006, 51). Cuban émigrés based in the United States sent dozens of 
filibustering expeditions to Cuba from 1895 to 1898 (Tone 2006, 82).  
 The Cleveland administration declared the U.S. as a “neutral” in the war, 
but fundamentally the U.S. government did little to stop the flow of weapons and 
supplies into Cuba. Additionally the governments of Mexico, Costa Rica, 
Columbia and Venezuala were also either unwilling or unable to stop Cuban 
émigré communities from organizing and sending supplies to the island. 
Meanwhile, the Spanish navy was far too small to effectively blockade 2,000 
miles of coastline (Tone 2006, 83). The steady supply of weapons and 
ammunition was vital for the Cuban rebel’s ability to maintain continuous 
operations against the Spanish. 
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 The situation in the Philippines was quite a different story. By 1899 
Aguinaldo commanded an Army of 80,000 men on paper, but in reality the Army 
of Liberation didn’t have the conventional resources to stand up to a 
contemporary regular army. The Filipinos had no cavalry, artillery nor even 
enough guns and ammunition for every fighter. They had no means of 
domestically producing arms or supplies except one hastily established munitions 
factory near Manila, which was quickly overrun by American forces after fighting 
began. They also did not have enough uniforms, shoes or medical supplies. The 
only way the rebels were able to acquire key military resources was through 
capture or purchases abroad. Without a navy the Filipinos would have difficulty 
getting any supplies from abroad past the American blockade (Halsted 1898, 
123-124). 
 Indeed, the U.S. navy “played a crucial role,” blockading foreign arms 
shipments and bottling up interisland trade. The American fleet made it so the 
rebels “could not send large numbers of troops outside Luzon,” while “Navy 
gunboats shut down coastal traffic– absolutely essential in an archipelago lacking 
roads–and disrupted the revolutionaries’ efforts to raise and transport funds (Linn 
2000, 325). The absence of naval support was an impossible difficulty for the 
Filipinos to overcome. In the 1770s rebellious American colonists were fortunate 
enough to have a small conventional army and didn’t have to contend with the 
difficulty of defending an archipelago. Yet despite their advantages, even the 
Americans required naval support from the French to help them get regular 
shipments of supplies and deny the British their own naval support at crucial 
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moments such as Yorktown in 1781. According to Weigley, “The French Navy 
had given the American revolutionary cause the additional moral impetus that 
was almost certainly indispensable” (1991, 241).  
 
Racial ambiguity in Cuba vs. racial inferiority in the Philippines 
 
 At the beginning of the war Aguinaldo and the other leading ilustrados 
were determined to form a rebel government, administration and conventional 
army to defend their country in a traditional European manner. The ilustrados 
were well aware that most of the Western world considered Filipinos inferior and 
uncivilized, and they wanted to form a Western-style government and army to 
demonstrate their level of civilization and potentially gain crucial foreign 
recognition and support. 
 American General Charles Whittier, who had accompanied the 
expeditionary forces as an advisor, met with Aguinaldo and discussed the 
difficulty of the Filipinos’ military situation shortly before the conflict began. 
Whittier explained to the revolutionary leader that he “must consider that they are 
without any navy and without capital, which is greatly needed for the 
development of the country,” and essentially “that the Philippine Government 
alone did not possess the element of strength to insure the retention of the 
islands without the assistance of other governments” (PIS, pt. 6: 65-67). 
Interestingly, Aguinaldo agreed with Whittier, further suggesting he was hoping 
domestic U.S. politics or foreign powers would aid the rebel cause. 
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 Although the Filipinos quickly defeated Spanish forces outside of Manila 
and occupied the rest of Luzon in 1898, this was largely because the Spanish 
were fighting two rebellions and the Filipinos received critical support from the 
U.S. Spain lacked adequate resources and political will to seriously defend the 
Philippines, which eventually became a moot point after the U.S. Navy destroyed 
the Spanish fleet and blockaded Spain from reinforcing the islands. However 
despite their weakness, the Spanish were still largely able to suppress the 
rebellion in Luzon before American entry into the war.  
 Some rebel ilustrados hoped that by defeating the Americans outside 
Manila and perhaps even capturing the city the Filipinos might gain foreign 
recognition or support, but this simply was not a realistic hope after the Senate 
accepted the Treaty of Paris. In July 1899 Benito Legarda, one of the three 
Filipinos who served on the Philippine Commission and a member of the 
Municipal Council in Manila, criticized rebels who still “dream a European 
intervention in our favor is to take place, without reflecting that the Treaty of Paris 
was made before all the civilized world and with its assent” (PIS, pt. 8, 27).  
 More than a year later collaborating ilustrados on the island of Panay tried 
to get rebel forces in control of the interior to stop fighting using a similar logic: 
“The other nations will not interfere here when they have not done so in the 
Transvaal and Orange Free State, and are all more or less preparing themselves 
for events of greater interest to them” (PIS, pt. 11, 59). The Philippines were not 
part of the “civilized” world and not entitled to the same political rights or 
independence as Westerners. Defeating the Americans on the battlefield and 
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capturing Manila would do nothing to change the Filipinos’ status in this regard. 
The ilustrados of Panay were right: if European powers weren’t going to help 
Boer colonists descended from Europe, they certainly weren’t going to help the 
Filipino people. 
 Both Filipino and American leadership understood that either conventional 
or guerilla resistance would ultimately not be successful if the Filipinos could not 
receive recognition, military aid, and possibly even direct military support from 
another foreign power. Geo-political circumstances at the end of the 19th century 
uniquely benefited Cubans and hurt Filipinos. The extreme level of racism most 
Western populations exhibited towards non-white peoples made it difficult for 
Filipinos to get foreign support because the consensus international view held 
non-whites to be less than human.  
 White supremacy was the lynchpin of the increasingly fragile pre-World 
War I global order, so even opportunistic new powers like Germany and Japan 
would not risk helping non-white rebels in another country for fear of inspiring 
those under their own colonial administration. The Cubans were fortunate (from a 
military perspective) because of the ambiguity surrounding their “whiteness.” 
Cuba was already informally part of the American economic imperium and 
American capitalists wanted to sever Cuba’s formal connection to Spain, so 
American media overwhelmingly and erroneously depicted the rebels as 
basically white. Indeed, before Americans arrived on Cuba the American press 
the depicted the Spanish as barbaric and less than white at the beginning of the 
conflict. However just prior the U.S. intervention, American newspapers 
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transformed Cuban revolutionaries into “anarchist negro hordes,” while the 
whiteness of Spain was rediscovered (Tone 2006, 11-12). The lesson was clear: 
at the turn of the twentieth century, any population that was not considered white 
enough by the international (really Western) community could not count on 























 Waging a guerilla war of attrition is a strategy that takes time and almost 
always requires outside help, whether it be recognition of belligerency, critical 
loans and arms shipments, or direct military aid from a state hostile to the 
occupying powers interests. Although the Philippine-American war demonstrates 
nationalism can prolong domestic resistance against a powerful occupying 
foreign nation, it also shows that without some kind of external support such 
resistance can be defeated by targeting civilians. Filipinos desperately needed 
foreign support, but given the racist logic of the time they had little chance of 
receiving it.  
 In order for a guerilla strategy to work, it is also important for rebels to 
carefully guard resources and avoid the desire to form a conventional army and 
wage a conventional war effort. Thus another major difference between the 
Cubans and Filipinos was Cuban rebels smartly choose to avoid conventional 
operations and focus exclusively on guerilla tactics, while Filipino rebels wasted 
resources forming conventional forces and attempting to campaign like the 
American army. Nevertheless, that Filipinos resisted as long as they did without 
substantial support is further testament to how widespread national resistance to 
American occupation was. Linn is critical of the Filipinos for waging a 
conventional campaign and tying so many of their hopes to a potential Bryan 
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election in 1900, but this was probably the best (albeit still slim) chance they had 
for gaining independence at the time (Linn 1900, 187). 
 The general weakness of Spain was also a major factor in explaining the 
different outcomes. Had Cuba still been under the control of any major European 
power, it is extremely difficult to imagine the United States intervening in Cuba, 
humanitarian disaster or no. The British carried out an equally brutal and 
destructive counterinsurgency campaign against Boer civilians in South Africa 
between 1899-1902, but even the humanitarian suffering of white colonists was 
not enough to induce another major power to fight the mighty British Empire. 
Nationalist guerilla warfare had become a powerful force by 1900, but it did not 
become routinely effective at defeating colonial powers until the global white 
supremacist order started collapsing in 1945. By the 1950s communist Russia 
and China began strongly supporting national liberation in non-white societies, 
giving anti-colonial guerillas an endless stream of critical military supplies. 
 Nationalism remains a powerful force in modern society – one that 
scholars have long recognized shapes and is shaped by war (Tilly 1995; 
Hutchison 2009). This is clearly demonstrated by the recent wars in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the current war in the Ukraine, and even probably by the 
Islamic State movement, which arguably is far more nationalist than religious in 
character (using religious language and symbolism to propagate primarily 
nationalist discourse). Thus it is also becoming clear that nationalism has 
increased the frequency and intensity of warfare – despite the proliferation of 
modern democracies, warfare is becoming harsher and more violent (Downes 
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2008; Wimmer 2013). The era of effective conventional military combat ended 
long ago, and that the rise of nationalism has caused modern states to pursue 
increasingly violent and destructive strategies to combat nationalist resistance. 
(Weigley 1973 & 1991; Downes 2008). Indeed warfare in Cuba and Philippines 
demonstrated the difficulty of waging a war of occupation while simultaneously 
maintaining liberal humanitarian ideals. 
 There is an old military adage that “generals are always preparing to fight 
the last war.” However, nationalism has transformed warfare so much since the 
classic age of conventional warfare, it would be more accurate to say modern 
generals are still preparing to fight in the pre-nationalist “Age of Battles.” Current 
military and political leaders must recognize how profoundly warfare has 
changed in the age of nationalism. If nationalist insurgencies cannot be isolated 
and denied material support to continue fighting, then conventional military forces 
will be unable prevail (Mumford 2012). Additionally, even if nationalist are denied 
material support, substantial levels of violence and wars of long duration are 
inevitable (Downes 2008). Modern leaders would do well to recognize these new 
realities to avoid excessive waste of blood and treasure over wars that can no 
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